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ABSTRACT 
Long before the onset of the now-emblematic quarrel between England and 
Greece over the Parthenon marbles, nations and tribes have squabbled over the 
extraterritorial transfer of objects of purported cultural significance.  Over the past 
few decades, however, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of cultural 
property repatriation claims, mostly targeting U.S. collections. 
The value of cultural artifacts is generated largely by the intellectual expression 
they manifest.  Digital technologies make increasingly possible the creation of 
reproductions of even three-dimensional artifacts, which are indistinguishable from 
the originals.  This development challenges our attributing value to the “aura” of 
the original renderings of tangible cultural artifacts.  Stripped of their auras, the 
worth of these objects devolves to the sum of the value of the physical materials 
deployed in their creation, and that ascribed to the perceptible intellectual 
expression they contain. 
If we were to perceive cultural artifacts fundamentally as works of information 
rather than of tangible property, the location of the original instantiations of them 
would be of little significance.  Three-dimensional technologies might soon permit 
source nations to retain the essential intellectual value of cultural artifacts found 
within their borders, while simultaneously capitalizing upon sales of the originals 
to collectors who will pay for their “aura.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
Toward the end of Woody Allen’s Small Time Crooks, Ray, the bungler played 
by Allen, attempts to conceal his theft of an emerald necklace by replacing it in the 
safe in which it is stored with a cheap imitation.1  The scene is set at a party on 
New York’s Upper East Side.  Ray is so discombobulated by the risk of his 
hostess’s discovery of him in flagrante delicto that he becomes confused as to 
which of the two pieces is genuine.  After an agony of indecision, he pockets the 
glass fake, which his more discerning wife, Frenchy, dismissively destroys when he 
presents it to her as their ticket to retirement in Florida.2 
In fact, even if the rendering of the Chinatown knock-off had been more artfully 
wrought so as to be visually indistinguishable from the original, the weight and 
other haptic qualities of the two objects would enable connoisseurs easily to 
distinguish between them.  Suppose, however, that Ray’s botched heist had 
involved not a gold and emerald necklace, but rather an equally precious ancient 
carving or sculptural work, perhaps rendered in ivory, jade, or marble.  If the copy 
were visually indistinguishable from the original and fashioned from the same 
material, even experts might be unable, using vision and touch, to tell one from the 
other. 
One could still readily identify the original work by using radiocarbon, or other 
dating technologies like thermoluminescence, that reveal otherwise imperceptible 
information about the composition of organic and inorganic materials.3  This 
information is both historically and economically significant.  An Aztec stone mask 
from the pre-Columbian era, for instance, will command a much higher price at 
auction than an indistinguishable copy of it from the twenty-first century.4  Twenty-
first century technologies, however, that enable ever more precise recording and re-
creation of information about physical objects, challenge the rationality of this 
economic discrimination. 
Works of intellectual expression whose value depends little on the materials in 
which they are fixed—e.g. literary, dramatic, and musical works—are most 
tractable to digital reproductions that are no less valuable than the original 
 
 1. SMALL TIME CROOKS (DreamWorks 2000).   
 2. Small Time Crooks chronicles the Pygmalion-like transformation of the nouveau riche 
Frenchy through her deft acquisition of savoir-faire with high-class indicators like wine, classical music, 
art, and jewels.  By the end of the movie she is sufficiently sophisticated to be capable of identifying a 
“clinker” as such.   
 3. See A DICTIONARY OF CHEMISTRY (John Daintith ed., 6th ed. 2008) (carbon dating is a 
“method of estimating the ages of archaeological specimens of biological origin”; thermoluminescence 
is a process by which “[b]y comparing the luminescence produced by heating a piece of pottery of 
unknown age with the luminescence produced by heating similar materials of known age, a fairly 
accurate estimate of the age of an object can be made.”). 
 4. In 2011 Sotheby’s sold an Aztec mask made between 450-650 A.D. for $530,500.  
Teotihuacan Greenstone Mask, Classic, ca. A.D. 450-650, SOTHEBY’S (May 13, 2011), 
http://www.sothebys.com/en/auctions/ecatalogue/2011/african-oceanic-and-precolumbian-art-
n08749/lot.177.html [http://perma.cc/28XP-AWGH].  Replicas of similar objects made of the same 
materials are sold on eBay for under $100.   
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manifestations of the works.5  The same is true of sound recordings, popular music, 
and motion pictures that are now typically fixed, even at the outset, in digital 
media.  Even molecular compositions of works of flavor and fragrance now can be 
analyzed through gas chromatography and mass spectrometry technologies, 
enabling the reproduction of perfumes and aromas indistinguishable from their 
models.6  And increasingly, digital technologies make possible not only the capture 
of information about three-dimensional works but also the fabrication of facsimiles 
of scanned objects. 
Three-dimensional scan and print technologies have significant implications for 
the fine art and antiquities markets relating to the unauthorized reproduction of 
copyrighted 3D works and the manufacture of counterfeits.7  Less immediately 
apparent, however, are the implications of these technologies for how we perceive 
and resolve claims for the repatriation of three-dimensional cultural artifacts.  This 
Article focuses on this latent capacity. 
From time immemorial, there have been disputes involving title to, and 
possession of, objects claimed to belong to a nation’s cultural patrimony.  Long 
before the onset of the now-emblematic quarrel between England and Greece over 
the Parthenon marbles, nations and tribes have squabbled over the transfer of 
objects of cultural property.8  The last few decades, however, have witnessed an 
extraordinary increase in the number of cultural property repatriation claims.9 
Several factors have contributed to this development.  World War II precipitated 
the destruction and relocation of vast quantities of cultural artifacts throughout 
Europe that included not only objects confiscated from Jewish families, but also 
many works that were expropriated from national collections.10  This catastrophe 
prompted post-war efforts to establish international conventions to forestall its 
recurrence, as well as a robust network of resources dedicated to the recovery of 
property confiscated during the Holocaust.11  Also, in the decades following World 
 
 5. While an autograph manuscript of, for example, a Mozart symphony, is vastly more 
economically valuable than a modern edition of it, the modern edition has considerably greater practical 
worth. 
 6. See Daintith, supra note 3 (“Gas chromatography is often used to separate a mixture into its 
components, which are then directly injected into a mass spectrometer.  This technique is known as gas 
chromatography-mass spectroscopy or GCMS.”). 
 7. See Lucas S. Osborn, Of PhDs Pirates, and the Public: Three-Dimensional Printing 
Technology and the Arts, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 811 (2014) (offering an overview of various copyright 
quandaries raised by 3D print technology).  
 8. See Joseph P. Fishman, Locating the International Interest in Intranational Cultural Property 
Disputes, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 347, 348–49 (2010) (quoting the Greek historian Polybius who decried 
the plundering of subjugated Greek cities by Roman conquerors). 
 9. See Charles Cronin & Erik Nemeth, Cultural Property Case Resource, USC GOULD SCHOOL 
OF LAW, http://uscar.usc.edu (last visited Sept. 25, 2015) (a sample of 350 cases between 1970 and 2015 
showed that most claims were initiated after 1990).   
 10. See generally LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF EUROPE’S 
TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1995). 
 11. On these international conventions, see infra note 32 and accompanying text.  The New York 
State Holocaust Claims Processing Office is one of many programs established to assist with recovery of 
property seized by Nazis during the Second World War.  Holocaust Claims Processing Office, NEW 
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War II, former European colonies asserting their sovereignty have demanded the 
return of objects of cultural property transferred beyond their borders during eras of 
colonization.12 
Perhaps the most significant catalyst for the recent spate of claims by a growing 
number of nations, for the repatriation of moveable cultural artifacts, has been the 
accommodation by the United States government of foreign assertions of title to 
artifacts owned by private and institutional collectors in the United States.13  The 
ulterior motive behind the Executive Branch’s brisk prosecution of these foreign 
claims and concerns against its citizenry has been the promotion abroad of 
goodwill and cooperation to further, for instance, United States’ trade and security 
interests.14  This prosecutorial zeal, however, has also generated disquietude within 
the United States community of antiquities collectors and dealers.  Museums in 
particular are now apprehensive about not only perceptions of the integrity of their 
existing collections, but also the viability of ongoing development of these 
collections through acquisitions and contributions.15 
This Article posits that the potential of digital technologies to record and 
reproduce three-dimensional works should bear on how we perceive tangible works 
of cultural property, and how we resolve disputes over their ownership.  It suggests 
that the economic and aesthetic value of most material cultural artifacts, like statues 
and paintings, should be attributed to the intellectual expression they manifest.  As 
this expression increasingly can be captured and replicated, the original physical 
manifestations of this expression should be perceived as less precious than they 
were heretofore. 
Nations rich in archaeological artifacts—typically developing nations, or 
economically weak countries like Italy and Greece—could capitalize on their 
archaeological resources by selling original artifacts, while still possessing 
indistinguishable copies that contain most of the value of the originals.  The 
window of opportunity for such capitalization, however, may be limited:  with 
nanotechnologies on the horizon, and atomic-level replication of objects that they 
will enable someday, the economic worth of original archaeological artifacts should 
eventually wane to the point that they are valued, like literary and musical works, 
entirely for the human expression they evince. 
The following discussion explores the thesis that works of cultural property are 
ultimately works of cultural information.  It considers 3D scan and print 
technologies and their copyright implications, and proposes the potential of these 
technologies to influence the resolution of cultural property repatriation claims.  
 
YORK DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/consumer/holocaust/hcpoindex.htm [https://perma.cc/S8DN-YCM6?type=image] 
(last visited Sept. 25, 2015). 
 12. See JEANETTE GREENFIELD, THE RETURN OF CULTURAL TREASURES (2d ed. 1996) 
(discussing claims for the return of cultural artifacts by many former colonies following World War II). 
 13. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.  
 14. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 15. Infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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We first set the stage, however, with an overview of the development of cultural 
property policy in the United States over the past fifty years, and the role that 
national and international law has played in it. 
I.  DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES CULTURAL PROPERTY 
POLICY 
A.  WHAT IS “CULTURAL PROPERTY”? 
While a nation or population’s cultural patrimony comprises intangibles like 
language, music, dance, humor, and cuisine, cultural property usually refers to 
physical, man-made objects.16  Objects of cultural property can be as massive and 
immobile as the Hagia Sophia, or as compact and portable as a Mesopotamian 
cylinder seal.17  The term “property,” rather than “patrimony,” however, as 
qualifying something associated with a particular nation or people, implies 
ownership.  We consider Shakespeare’s dramas to be part of England’s cultural 
patrimony, but not to be England’s cultural property.  On the other hand, we regard 
Stonehenge to be a component of England’s patrimony, but also to be English 
property. 
It is the physicality of cultural property objects that make them more 
troublesome than intangible elements of cultural patrimony.  James Cuno, the CEO 
of the J. Paul Getty Trust, alluded to this phenomenon in a reference to the 
“stubbornness of objects”:  “It’s not the same with music, it’s not the same with 
film, it’s not the same with literature—but when it comes to physical objects, these 
things are kept as evidence of a proud past, as defined by the nation-state 
government.”18 
It is also more difficult to eradicate intangible cultural property—language, 
cuisine, religion, etc.—than it is tangible objects like statues.19  Tangible cultural 
property objects are therefore more vulnerable to theft and destruction than not only 
intangibles like language and costume, but also tangible, yet more fungible goods 
like oil and grain.  Aggressor armies and terrorists capitalize on this fact when they 
 
 16. UNESCO asserts an enormously broad definition of cultural heritage that encompasses 
“tangible” and “intangible cultural heritage,” “natural heritage” (landscapes and biological formations), 
and “heritage in the event of armed conflict.”  Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Property, UNESCO, http://
www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-property/unesco-database-of-
national-cultural-heritage-laws/frequently-asked-questions/definition-of-the-cultural-heritage/ [http://
perma.cc/BB9H-J5JY] (last visited Sept. 25, 2015). 
 17. Cylinder seals are small cylindrical stones “carved with relief decoration, which was rolled 
across wet clay items . . . to indicate their genuineness . . . .”  A DICTIONARY OF ARCHAEOLOGY 188 
(Ian Shaw & Robert Jameson eds., 1999).   
 18. Rachel Donadio, Vision of Home: Repatriated Works Back in Their Country of Origin, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 20, 2014, at AR1, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/20/arts/design/repatriated-works-back-
in-their-countries-of-origin.html.  
 19. England’s imposition, for hundreds of years, of the English language upon Gaelic speakers in 
Scotland and Ireland failed to extirpate Gaelic; China’s ongoing persecution of religious adherents has 
not eliminated Buddhism, nor even Christianity, in China. 
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confiscate or destroy objects prized by their victims.  Typically these objects hold 
economic and aesthetic value, as well as emotional significance, to the victims.20 
B.  WHAT IS REPATRIATION? 
We typically associate “repatriation” with humans who have been displaced 
from their homelands:  refugees, prisoners of war, hostages, and illegal immigrants.  
While illegal immigrants and refugees do not want to be returned to their native 
lands, “repatriation” has generally positive overtones associated with happy 
reunifications and a sense of rightness of place. 
When we use “repatriation” in connection with cultural property, we 
anthropomorphize objects, implying not only that these objects have a homeland, 
but also that, like humans, they have an innate yearning to be located within a 
particular locus and culture, a phenomenon Germans refer to as “Heimat.”21  The 
five remaining Caryatids on the Acropolis’s Erechthion are said to wail at night 
over Elgin’s removal in 1801 of their sixth “sister.”22  Effrosyni Moschoudi, a 
popular Greek novelist, claims:  “[t]here isn’t one among us that doesn’t regard 
them as living and breathing things while we watch them wait.”23  Of course, such 
thoughts and feelings projected onto inanimate objects simply reflect those of the 
individuals transmitting them.24 
 
 20. Napoleon carried off to Paris the Horses of St. Mark’s not only to adorn the Place du 
Carrousel with a dazzling sculpture, but also to underscore France’s subjugation of Venice.  See SIMON 
HOUPT, MUSEUM OF THE MISSING: A HISTORY OF ART THEFT 33 (2006) (discussing the role of 
Dominique-Vivant Denon, director-general of museums under Napoleon).  Members of the Taliban, on 
the other hand, could only destroy the non-transferrable World Trade Center towers that symbolized 
United States economic might they so resented, as well as the Bamiyan Buddhas that signified a religion 
other than their own—despite the fact that each object held great economic value.  See W. L. Rathje, 
Why the Taliban are Destroying Buddhas, USA TODAY (Mar. 22, 2001), http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/science/archaeology/2001-03-22-afghan-buddhas.htm [http://perma.cc/
5GZK-WDGM] (“The colossal Buddhas were cut at immeasurable cost (probably in the third and fifth 
centuries A.D.) into the tall sandstone cliffs surrounding Bamiyan . . . .”).   
 21. See DICTIONARY OF UNTRANSLATABLES 430 (Barbara Cassin ed., 2014) (observing the 
complexity of the word “Heimat,” which connotes a place of both origin and settlement).   
 22. The five Caryatids were moved to the Acropolis Museum, and replicas of them installed in 
their original location on the south porch of the Acropolis temple known as the Erechtheion.  See The 
Erechtheion, THE ACROPOLIS MUSEUM, http://www.theacropolismuseum.gr/en/content/erechtheion 
[http://perma.cc/9QC4-S6PT] (last visited Sept. 25, 2015).  There have been no reports, however, of the 
Caryatids’s wailing over this indignity.  Perhaps the impulse to anthropomorphize Greek statuary can be 
attributed in part to the Greek language.  The statement of authorship in Greek on, for instance, works 
from the early Roman Empire created by Ennion, a glassmaker, is not “made by Ennion” but more 
precisely, “Ennion made me.”  See Ken Johnson, ‘Ennion’ at the Met, Profiles an Ancient Glassmaker, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2015, at C22, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/06/arts/design/review-ennion-at-
the-met-profiles-an-ancient-glassmaker.html.   
 23. Effrosyni Moschoudi, What are the Parthenon Marbles to the Greeks?, EFFROSYNI’S BLOG 
(Nov. 19, 2013), https://effrosinimoss.wordpress.com/2013/11/19/what-are-the-parthenon-marbles-to-
the-greeks/ [https://perma.cc/C5SK-E43L].    
 24. Such projections onto insensate objects are also a gambit to elicit sympathy for one’s position 
regarding the disposition of those objects by posing as a disinterested advocate for a purportedly 
oppressed victim.   
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Repatriation of persons involves their physical transfer to a political entity—a 
nation with a government.  It usually also involves transfer to a particular 
geographical location.  Repatriation of cultural property objects also involves their 
transfer both to a government and to a place.  Unlike living persons, however, these 
objects often have only attenuated ties to the modern nations and cultures into 
which they are “repatriated.”  The Venetian Republic, for instance, was no more 
associated than was France with the creation of the Triumphal Quadriga (“Horses 
of St. Mark”) that were repatriated to Venice from France in 1815 after Napoleon’s 
drubbing at Waterloo.25  Similarly, the purported bond between Italy and the 
Euphronios krater—given by the Metropolitan Museum to the Italian government 
in 2006—was based on a claim that this Greek object had likely been excavated in 
Tuscany.26 
Even when antiquities are sent to the geographical locations where they were 
created, the inevitable political changes and human migrations over millennia 
render sophistical claims of emotional attachment between the current population 
and that of the creators of the object.27  The fluidity of national boundaries further 
belies the legitimacy of repatriation claims rooted in jingoistic rhetoric.  The 
Euphronios krater, for example, a Greek object, purportedly excavated from an 
Etruscan grave is no more “Italian” than a two-thousand-year-old arrowhead 
excavated in Massachusetts is “American.” 
C.  INTERNATIONAL POLICY ON CULTURAL PROPERTY: THE UNESCO 
CONVENTION 
While the rightful possession of cultural artifacts has been a perennially 
 
 25. Like the French in the late eighteenth century, the Venetians, in the thirteenth, during the sack 
of Constantinople, absconded with the bronze horses.  Venice’s Triumphal Quadriga, like London’s 
Parthenon Marbles, raises the question to what extent cultural objects that have been removed from their 
original locations can acquire, over time, supranational cultural significance.  The disposition of the 
Parthenon Marbles “demonstrates the emergence of a particular form of national distinctiveness that 
transcended the smallness of particularity and rose to the level of universal civilization.”  Fiona Rose-
Greenland, The Parthenon Marbles as Icons of Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Britain, 19 NATIONS 
& NATIONALISM 654, 654 (2013).  
 26. See Neil Brodie, Euphronios (Sarpedon) Krater, TRAFFICKING CULTURE (Sept. 6, 2012), 
http://traffickingculture.org/encyclopedia/case-studies/euphronios-sarpedon-krater [http://perma.cc/
S5CE-YDEK].  In a preemptive effort to avert attention to the peculiar outcome of the Italian claim—
i.e. the acquisition by Italy of a Greek work from an American collection—the Italian government 
promptly loaned the krater to the National Archaeology Museum of Athens where it was displayed in 
2014 in an exhibition “Classicità ed Europa: The Common Destiny of Greece and Italy.”  The political 
motivations for this loan are evident from commentary that accompanied the display of the krater 
exalting “the fortunate coincidence [of] the successive assumption of the Presidency of the European 
Union by the two countries in 2014.  The [exhibition] is the premier event celebrating the two 
Presidencies.”  Photo of exhibition label (on file with author). 
 27. See generally WHOSE CULTURE?: THE PROMISE OF MUSEUMS AND THE DEBATE OVER 
ANTIQUITIES (James Cuno ed., 2009) (documenting the vast cultural and temporal divides between 
creators of antiquities and modern states claiming that present-day inhabitants of lands populated 
thousands of years ago are the descendants, and sole heirs of the cultural artifacts, of these earlier 
dwellers).   
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contentious issue among nations for millennia, only in the past few decades has it 
developed into a mainstream political matter involving diplomats, politicians, 
archeologists, and various participants in the art and antiquities market.28  Today, 
cultural property disputes and their resolutions are interesting not only to 
archaeologists, collectors, and lawyers working in this field, but also to journalists 
and other commentators who inform the general public with a steady stream of 
intelligence in this area.29 
The recent dramatic surge in the number of cultural property disputes is 
paradoxical because since 1970, governments have increasingly promulgated 
international and national legislation whose ostensible purpose is to combat looting 
and international transfer of cultural objects.  This rise in the number of disputes 
suggests either that this legislation has failed to curb looting or transfer of 
antiquities, or that it has served mainly to encourage nations to assert claims for the 
return of objects once located within their borders. 
Most national prohibitions on the export of cultural property were not enacted 
until after the Enlightenment and the surge of nationalism in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.30  National legislation governing the ownership and 
movement of objects of cultural property may be relatively laissez-faire, like that of 
wealthy nations like Japan and the United States; or more restrictive, like that of 
less affluent nations like Italy and Mexico, which assert state ownership over 
objects of cultural property found even on private property within their borders.31  
National legislation is of little avail, however, to one country’s assertion of 
ownership, and control of movement, of objects located in another nation.  Such 
assertions, however, may become effective when international law is brought into 
play. 
The 1954 Hague Convention, negotiated in response to the Nazis’ rampant 
destruction and confiscation of cultural artifacts, was the first international 
convention to deal specifically with the protection of cultural property.32  The goal 
of this convention is the mitigation of collateral and gratuitous damage during 
armed conflict among signatories.33  The Convention’s preamble establishes that its 
 
 28. A sample of approximately 350 cultural property repatriation disputes since 1970 shows that 
well over half these cases were initiated after 2000.  See Cronin, supra note 9.   
 29. See generally ERIK NEMETH, CULTURAL SECURITY: EVALUATING THE POWER OF CULTURE 
IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (2015) (discussing the significant expansion of interest across disciplines in 
cultural property as it becomes a significant influence in the shaping of international policy and 
security). 
 30. As early as the fifteenth century, however, Pope Pius II prohibited the export of works of art 
from the Vatican.  See Halina Nieć, Legislative Models of Protection of Cultural Property, 27 HASTINGS 
L. J. 1089, 1092 (1976).  
 31. Id.   
 32. The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 
14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter Hague Convention].  One of the most notorious examples of 
Nazi brutality toward cultural property was its destruction of the mountaintop monasteries in Meteora, 
Greece.  See Famous Monasteries in Greece Destroyed; German Mountain Guns Razed Cloisters at 
Meteora, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1944, at 5.   
 33. Earlier conventions of 1899 and 1907 referenced the protection of cultural property among 
CRONIN, 3D PRINTING: CULTURAL PROPERTY AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2015) 
2015] 3D PRINTING: CULTURAL PROPERTY AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 9 
 
purpose is to protect and preserve cultural property on behalf of all mankind.34  It 
requires signatories not only to establish within their militaries units trained to 
protect cultural property during times of armed conflict, but also to take peacetime 
measures to identify and safeguard significant works of cultural property.35  It also 
established the “blue shield” as the symbol by which parties are to identify works 
of cultural property eligible for protection.36 
Whereas the Hague Convention was engendered by collective rue during the 
aftermath of war, the UNESCO Convention was forwarded largely by assertions by 
once-colonized states about the flow of objects of cultural patrimony associated 
with these source nations to wealthier market nations.37  For instance, the British 
and Dutch colonization of India, or the French of Haiti, involved not only 
wholesale despoliation of natural resources, and virtual enslavement of indigenous 
populations, but also the removal of vast assemblages of cultural objects, most of 
which remain in Europe today.38  Collective aggrievement among the governments 
of erstwhile colonies over this ransacking motivated the UNESCO Convention, just 
as similarly pooled regret in the aftermath of World War II prompted the Hague 
Convention.39 
Unlike the Hague Convention, the UNESCO Convention is prescriptive, with a 
 
other matters implicated by armed conflict.  See 1899 Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land and its Annex, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247; Hague 
Convention (IV) Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631.  The 
conventions of 1899 and 1907 had been roundly breached during the two world wars earlier in the 
twentieth century.  See Adriaan Bos, Words of Welcome, in PROTECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY IN 
ARMED CONFLICT xvi (Nout van Woudenberg & Liesbeth Lijnzaad eds., 2010).  These violations led to 
near-apocalyptic ruination of public and private cultural property in Europe, enabled by destructive 
technologies unknown at the time the earlier conventions were negotiated.  That devastation, in turn, 
prompted drafting of the Hague Convention. 
 34. “Being convinced that damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever 
means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the 
culture of the world . . . .”  Hague Convention, supra note 33, Preamble.  
 35. Hague Convention, supra note 33, at arts. 3, 7.   
 36. Hague Convention, supra note 33, at arts. 16, 17.  Identifying culturally significant works to 
protect them during wartime seems counterintuitive.  The prominent tagging of cultural monuments and 
artifacts could potentially render these objects more, rather than less, vulnerable to destruction or theft 
by an enemy.  
 37. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter UNESCO 
Convention].  “UNESCO”, the acronym of the “intellectual” agency of the United Nations, indicates the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.  UNESCO.ORG, http://en.unesco.org/
about-us/introducing-unesco  [http://perma.cc/7WTT-WUQD] (last visited Oct. 7, 2015).  See ASIF 
EFRAT, GOVERNING GUNS, PREVENTING PLUNDER: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGAINST ILLICIT 
TRADE 121 (2010) (noting, e.g., Peru’s and Mexico’s early promotion of the UNESCO Convention).   
 38. “The United Kingdom stands out as a principal holder of some of the major cultural treasures 
of the world, primarily because of her colonial history, although not all the treasures were acquired as a 
direct result of this.  Many were acquired simply as the result of long-distance archaeological raids and 
these were not always carried out by archaeologists.”  GREENFIELD, supra note 12, at 91.  
 39. “Preservation of the cultural heritage was of much concern in a postcolonial environment, 
which was often rife with nationalist sentiments and where antiquities were deemed a part of the new 
nation’s identity.”  EFRAT, supra note 37, at 121.   
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strong nationalist bias evident from a preamble emphasizing the protection of 
cultural property as belonging to individual member states.40  While the focus of 
the Hague Convention is the prevention of destruction and looting of cultural 
property during war, that of the UNESCO Convention is the control of the 
movement and sale of cultural artifacts beyond the borders of the state in which 
they were created or found.  The UNESCO Convention effects this regulation by 
providing a mechanism for the retention and control of the transfer of antiquities in 
the modern states in which they are found, and specifically by requiring signatories 
to enforce each other’s cultural property export laws.41 
The initial version (“Secretariat Draft”) of the UNESCO Convention identified 
market nations that did not participate in its drafting as the agents of the 
depredation of national cultural patrimonies.42  This draft required every member 
state “(a) to prohibit the export of any item of ‘cultural property’ unless 
accompanied by an export certificate; and (b) to prohibit the importation of any 
item of ‘cultural property’ not ‘accompanied’ by such a certificate—that is, which 
was illegally exported.”43 
The draft thereby charged market nations with the responsibility to control 
within their borders, movement and commerce involving cultural property, as 
regulated by the national laws of the Convention’s signatories.44  Market nations, 
 
 40. “Considering that it is incumbent upon every State to protect the cultural property existing 
within its territory against the dangers of theft, clandestine excavation, and illicit export; considering 
that, to avert these dangers, it is essential for every State to become increasingly alive to the moral 
obligations to respect its own cultural heritage and that of all nations . . . .”  UNESCO Convention, 
supra note 37, Preamble.  See Jane Warring, Underground Debates: The Fundamental Differences of 
Opinion that Thwart UNESCO’s Progress in Fighting the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property, 19 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 227, 251 (2005) (noting that the UNESCO Convention “marks the beginning of the trend 
away from cultural internationalism and toward cultural nationalism”).  See also Janene Marie Podesta, 
Saving Culture, but Passing the Buck: How the 1970 UNESCO Convention Undermines its Goals by 
Unduly Targeting Market Nations, 16 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 457, 467 (2008) (observing that 
the Hague Convention is more a “general reflection on the importance of cultural property than an 
operative document”).   
 41. UNESCO Convention, supra note 37, at art. 5.  The Getty’s CEO James Cuno recently 
asserted that the unilateral dominion over antiquities that UNESCO establishes for the modern states in 
which these objects are found has abetted ISIS’ recent sacking of Assyrian archaeological monuments in 
Iraq.  See Letter to the Editor, Deploring ISIS, Destroyer of a Civilization’s Art, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 
2015, at A24, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/11/opinion/deploring-isis-destroyer-of-a-civilizations-
art.html.   
 42. See EFRAT, supra note 37, at 115. 
 43. Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN L. REV. 275, 371 (1982). 
 44. See id.  The United States has virtually no regulations curtailing export of its cultural property 
and does not, therefore, benefit from this shared obligation.  The only significant United States cultural 
property export regulation deals with Native American artifacts as protected by the Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3002–3007 (2000).  Moreover, this obligation 
compels the United States to enforce foreign cultural property ownership laws that are inconsistent with 
its own.  See Podesta, supra note 40, at 458 (discussing how Italian law governing ownership of 
antiquities found by an Italian farmer on his land is much more restrictive than those of market nations).  
See also Barbara Hoffman, International Art Transactions and the Resolution of Art and Cultural 
Property Disputes: A United States Perspective, in ART AND CULTURAL HERITAGE: LAW, POLICY, AND 
PRACTICE 159 (Barbara Hoffman ed., 2006).   
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including the United States, were naturally disinclined to join a convention that 
would unilaterally tax them with the costs of adjudication and enforcement—
against their economic, and arguably also cultural, interests—of the cultural 
property ownership claims and export restrictions of source nations.45 
The UNESCO Convention has no retroactive force, which means that only 
objects acquired by citizens of signatory nations after 1970 are subject to its 
terms.46  Enormous European collections of art and antiquities, acquired over 
centuries through colonization and military aggression, are, therefore, outside the 
Convention’s purview.47  By the second half of the twentieth century, collectors in 
the United States had become the most significant buyers of antiquities.  The 
impetus for the UNESCO Convention, therefore, appears to have been mainly the 
establishment of an instrument by which source nations could check acquisitions by 
United States collectors—or derive greater financial benefit from them.48 
 
 45. See EFRAT, supra note 37, at 123 (discussing specific objections made by Netherlands, 
Sweden, Britain, West Germany, and Japan to the draft convention).  Britain’s financial and political 
clout petered out with the demise of its Empire.  London has remained, however, one of the world’s 
largest markets for art and antiquities even though the native citizens, and similarly cash-strapped 
national museums, do not have the means to purchase the top-drawer works now sold in London 
galleries and auction houses.  As Efrat notes, “Britain is an important transit country for antiquities.”  
EFRAT, supra note 37, at 155 (emphasis added).  The English middlemen who sell these works to 
wealthy foreigners make significant commissions from these sales, and Britain did not want to 
jeopardize these profits through greater governmental oversight of this market as obligated by the 
UNESCO Convention.  Although Britain joined the Convention in 2002 “[i]ts budgetary constraints and 
favorable attitude toward the dealers have resulted in a less-than-wholehearted commitment to the 
efforts to protect the archaeological heritage.”  EFRAT, supra note 37, at 173.  In other words, while 
prosecutions under the UNESCO Convention hold the potential to suppress Britain’s antiquities market, 
the country’s civil service has averted this potential development through prosecutorial inaction.  See 
also David Whyte, The Paradox of Regulation: The Politics of Regulating Global Markets, in 
CRIMINOLOGY AND ARCHAEOLOGY 127 (Simon Mackenzie and Penny Green eds., 2009) (noting that 
UK regulatory reforms aimed at controlling the art market have failed and may even have worsened 
conditions they were meant to ameliorate).   
 46. “Neither the 1954 Hague Protocol, nor the UNESCO 1970 Convention . . . [is] retroactive: i.e. 
they do not apply to cases which occurred before the entry into force of the legal instrument concerned.”  
Lyndel Prott, UNESCO and Unidroit: a Partnership against Trafficking in Cultural Objects 68 (1996), 
UNIDROIT,  http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1995culturalproperty/articles/s70-prott-1996-
e.pdf.   
 47. In her discussion of the origins of major European antiquities collections, Jeanette Greenfield 
observes, “The United Kingdom was not alone in this; all the European countries which maintained 
colonial interests abroad mounted archaeological expeditions and amassed collections containing items 
which are of special cultural significance in their homeland.  These countries included France, Belgium, 
Germany, Holland Italy and Denmark.  Often objects were collected in the spirit of intense competition 
and rivalry, and this only hastened the destruction or removal of countless treasures.”  GREENFIELD, 
supra note 12, at 91.  See also Alan Riding, Why ‘Antiquities Trials’ Focus on America, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 25, 2005, at A16, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/25/arts/design/why-antiquities-trials-focus-on-
america.html (quoting the previous director of the Louvre, Henri Loyrette’s slippery explanation of the 
legitimacy of the Louvre’s collections based upon them having been “acquired in a legal way according 
to the practice of the time”).  
 48. The UNESCO Cultural Diversity Convention (2005) was motivated by similar resentment of 
the domination and wealth of the American entertainment industry.  See Carol Balassa, America’s Image 
Abroad: The UNESCO Cultural Diversity Convention and U.S. Motion Picture Exports (Vanderbilt 
University, Curb Center for Art, Enterprise & Public Policy, 2008) (noting that in promoting the 
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Of all market nations, the United States had, therefore, ostensibly the most to 
lose, and least to gain, economically and culturally, by acceding to the 
Convention.49  Rather than simply shunning participation in shaping the ultimate 
text of the Convention—the approach taken by Switzerland and Great Britain—the 
United States engaged in revision negotiations, enlisting support for their position 
from other market countries like France and West Germany.50  In 1972, the United 
States ratified the Convention, but exempted itself from Article 6’s sweeping 
requirement that signatories prohibit export of all objects they deem cultural 
property unless the export is expressly authorized by state authorities.51 
Deep skepticism within Congress as to the Convention’s positive potential for 
American interests delayed enactment of implementing legislation until 1982.52  
The crux of the implementing legislation, the Convention on Cultural Property 
Implementation Act (CCPIA), is the United States’ commitment to Article 9 of the 
 
Convention the French government, in particular, begrudged not only the financial power of Hollywood, 
but also the fact that its products, avidly consumed by French citizens, marginalize French culture and 
traditions).  
 49. “[T]he fact that market nations were severely under-represented, separately and jointly 
contributed to the nationalistic bias and resulting Convention.  The ensuing Articles placed most of the 
blame for the siphoning of cultural artifacts on the (absent) market nations, and therefore, gave them 
more responsibility to temper the flow.”  Podesta, supra note 40, at 469.   
 50. See EFRAT, supra note 37, at 134 (noting that one of the most important concerns of the 
United States—that was ultimately not accommodated—was the excision of the requirement that every 
exported item of cultural property would require a government-issued certificate).  Paul Bator, who 
participated on behalf of the United States in the drafting negotiations in Paris in 1970, prepared a 
detailed—and unintentionally comical—account of the process.  His description of the scene in Paris 
could be easily applied to a Marx Brothers movie or an opera buffa:  “The proceedings on the floor were 
themselves confused and disorderly. Everything took place in four languages simultaneously . . . .  
[E]arnest and intense arguments completely bypassed each other, or were simply unintelligible to some 
participants . . . .  Many of the most important votes were extremely close; their outcome was thus often 
heavily influenced by the fact that a given delegate was absent that day, or had stepped out or was busy 
talking, or had simply failed to understand what was going on (very few delegations were large enough 
to keep the floor “manned” at all times).  The vote tallies, too, were based on a disorderly and highly 
casual show of hands . . . .”  See Bator, supra note 43, at 375.   
 51. See Bator, supra note 43, at 328 (discussing the United States’ objection to the original draft 
of the Convention and its sweeping obligations including imposition of disciplinary and penal sanctions, 
and the prohibition of reservations by signatories). 
 52. Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, Jan. 12, 1983, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2613 
[hereinafter CCPIA].  The CCPIA was signed into law by President Reagan in January, 1983.  See 
EFRAT, supra note 37, at 136 (discussing the lengthy and contentious legislative process involving the 
State Department’s efforts to obtain buy-in from archaeologists, art dealers, museums and private 
collectors).  An inherent paradox in market nations’ accession to the UNESCO Convention is the fact 
that it enables source nations to capitalize upon market nations’ prohibitions on the importation of 
cultural objects—with no corresponding imposition on the source nation—by simply selling export 
certificates to the highest bidder among Convention signatories.  Of course no signatory would overtly 
engage in conduct flagrantly at odds with an agreement whose objective is to suppress the illicit transfer 
of cultural property among its member states.  UNESCO Convention source nations do, however, 
covertly capitalize on market nations’ adherence to the Convention—the United States in particular—by 
maintaining corrupt customs administrations whose officers accept financial bribes to facilitate illegal 
exports.  These exported objects could later become the subject of repatriation claims based upon their 
illegal export, lodged, remarkably enough, by the same source nation whose customs officials obtained 
payment under the table for legitimizing their export.   
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Convention that obligates signatories to assist in forestalling the pillaging of 
cultural property through import regulations.53 
The CCPIA authorizes the President to entertain requests by other Convention 
signatories for the United States to promulgate import prohibitions on specified 
objects of cultural property.54  It also establishes the Cultural Property Advisory 
Committee (CPAC) to evaluate these requests, and to report its review of such 
calls, and the action it recommends regarding them, to the President.55 
The objective of the UNESCO Convention is to discourage looting of antiquities 
by obligating signatories to safeguard cultural objects, and by thwarting their 
movement through import/export controls.56  Both archaeologists and those 
opposed to the antiquities market controls inherent in the UNESCO Convention 
acknowledge, however, that since the Convention was first adopted in 1970, the 
looting and sale of illicitly acquired antiquities has only increased.57  This is 
remarkable given the Convention’s swiftly growing number of adherents and the 
positive externalities with respect to curbing looting that this expansion should 
 
 53. See CCPIA, supra note 52.  
 54. It does not authorize proactive action on the part of the President, and specifically prohibits it 
in cases involving “emergency conditions.”  See CCPIA, supra note 52.   
 55. CCPIA, supra note 52, § 2605.   
 56. Many source nations have abdicated their obligation under the UNESCO Convention to 
safeguard cultural monuments.  While Italy, for instance, is relatively wealthy compared to most source 
nations, its government is strikingly mingy in funding protection of the nation’s cultural monuments.  In 
2008, for instance, barely a quarter of a percent of the national budget was dedicated to cultural 
property heritage protection.  See Steven Urice, Between Rocks and Hard Places, 40 N. MEX. L. REV. 
123, 128 n.26 (2010).  The Italian government recently announced an initiative to make its museums and 
monuments more profit-driven and self-sustaining.  See Josephine McKenna, Italy Looks Abroad for 
New Colosseum Director in Museum Shake-up, THE TELEGRAPH (Dec. 22, 2014),  http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/11309051/Italy-looks-abroad-for-new-Colosseum-
director-in-museum-shake-up.html/.  See also Gaia Pianigiani & Jim Yardley, Corporate Medicis to the 
Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2014, at C1, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/arts/design/to-some-
dismay-italy-enlists-donors-to-repair-monuments.html (discussing the Mayor of Rome’s unabashed 
pursuit of Saudi money to pay for the restoration of public monuments in Italy).  With respect to the 
dilapidated condition of Rome’s Coliseum, Italian Culture Minister Dario Franceschini recently 
remarked, “The state has very limited resources unfortunately . . . .  This is an opportunity for a big 
company to sponsor an extraordinary project, which will capture the world’s attention.  It would be 
scandalous if no one comes forward.”  McKenna, supra.  By ignoring—intentionally or otherwise—
UNESCO’s requirement that its signatories take proactive measures to safeguard their cultural property, 
source nations may obliquely furnish modest livelihoods to some of their citizens, typically indigent 
agricultural workers employed by middlemen compatriots, who eke out a living through their 
unauthorized “excavations” on public lands. 
 57. “It is a melancholy observation that, although the UNESCO Convention on the Means of 
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 
was adopted as long ago as 1970, the destruction of archaeological sites through looting has increased 
rather than diminished in the thirty succeeding years.”  Colin Renfrew, Foreword to TRADE IN ILLICIT 
ANTIQUITIES:  THE DESTRUCTION OF THE WORLD’S ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE xi (Neil Brodie et al. 
eds., 2001).  See also Judith Church, Evaluating the Effectiveness of Foreign Laws on National 
Ownership of Cultural Property in U.S. Courts, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 179, 180 (1992) (noting 
the increase in illegal trafficking of cultural artifacts since the establishment of the UNESCO 
Convention in 1970 and a doubling of the total value of objects sold in this market annually between 
1972 and 1990). 
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have generated.58 
D.  UNESCO CONVENTION, DOMESTIC LAW, AND UNITED STATES CULTURAL 
POLICY 
One reason for the recent rapid growth in the number of repatriation claims has 
been the willingness of market nations—the United States in particular—to 
prosecute these claims.59  In the 1960s and 70s, United States assistance to Central 
American countries in controlling exploitation of their archaeological sites was 
motivated by a desire to cultivate stronger relations with our proximate neighbors 
to the south.60  In 1970, for instance, the United States entered into a bilateral treaty 
to secure Mexico’s cooperation in curbing the movement of stolen American 
automobiles crossing the border to the south, by agreeing to implement measures to 
check the movement of Mexican archaeological materials to the north.61 
Since the 1970s the Justice Department has regularly used two domestic laws to 
prosecute cultural property claims by foreign states against United States citizens: 
the National Stolen Property Act and the Archaeological Resources Protection 
Act.62  Prosecutions under these laws have led to the forfeiture of objects claimed 
by foreign nations, despite the fact that Congress never intended either law to be 
used for this purpose.63 
 
 58. In 1972 the Convention had three states parties; today it has 128.  States Parties to 1970 
Convention, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-
property/1970-convention/states-parties/ [http://perma.cc/6KBX-TKPC] (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).  See 
Urice, supra note 56, at 128 (noting the minimal effectiveness of patrimony statutes in reducing illicit 
trafficking in antiquities because of a lack of allocated resources and corrupt governments).  
 59. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.  This surge may also have been generated in part 
by the development, since World War II, of more efficient means by which to remove and transport 
archaeological artifacts, and a consequent augmentation of the illicit market in these objects.  “Even 
more than the tomb robber, the bulldozer imperils our archaeological heritage.”  KARL E. MEYER, THE 
PLUNDERED PAST 197 (1973).   
 60. See Bator, supra note 43, at 280 (identifying the “Maya crisis” as a catalyst for United States 
initiatives for the protection of Mexican cultural artifacts).   
 61. See EFRAT, supra note 37, at 131 (noting that in 1969 Mexico approached the State 
Department seeking assistance for the protection of its archaeological heritage in exchange for Mexico’s 
assistance in the recovery and return of American automobiles).   
 62. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311–2323 (2012); 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa–470mm (2012).  Even after the United 
States’ accession to, and eventual implementation of, the UNESCO Convention, the Justice Department 
has continued to prosecute foreign cultural property claims under the National Stolen Property Act.  This 
policy may, paradoxically, provide source nations an incentive not to seek the imposition of import 
restrictions in the United States under UNESCO, but rather to allow objects to leave the country and 
then seek to recoup them under United States law.  UNESCO requires source nations to compensate 
good-faith buyers whose property is repatriated.  By pursuing repatriation under the NSPA, however, a 
source nation could benefit not only by recovering the cultural property at issue, but also by having its 
citizens pocket the funds paid by the collector for the subsequently returned property. 
 63. See Andrew Adler & Stephen Urice, Resolving the Disjunction Between Cultural Property 
Policy and Law: A Call for Reform, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 117 (2011).  “[T]he NSPA was never intended 
to address the unique issues surrounding cultural property.”  Id. at 119.  “[A]lthough Congress expressly 
intended ARPA to apply only to archaeological resources originating within the United States, federal 
prosecutors have nonetheless applied it to foreign archaeological resources in the United States.”  Id. at 
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Instead, Congress intended the CCPIA to be the basis of national policy 
regarding foreign cultural property concerns.64  As Andrew Adler and Stephen 
Urice have demonstrated, however, the Executive Branch, in its prosecution of 
foreign claims under this law, has perverted the aim of the legislation and the 
“compromises democratically embedded” within it.65 
The CCPIA establishes conditions that a foreign nation must meet before the 
President may enter into a bilateral agreement obligating the United States to 
provide import regulations at its behest.66  For instance, under the CCPIA, a request 
for import controls must indicate specific categories of property that are in 
imminent danger of pillage, and the requesting state must establish that it has 
already taken measures to protect the property in question before petitioning the 
United States to promulgate a new import regulation on its behalf.67 
The Executive Branch has ignored these statutory stipulations and, in at least 
one instance, even encouraged a foreign state to lodge a CCPIA request for 
implementation of domestic import restrictions, despite the clear language of the 
CCPIA that such requests were to be sua sponte.68  The consequence of this 
insouciance towards these CCPIA provisions, which Congress brokered to offer a 
limited possibility of obtaining temporary import restrictions on specific objects of 
endangered cultural property, has been the Executive Branch’s provision of a 
“blank check” to foreign interests with respect to United States implementation of 
import prohibitions.69 
The role the CPAC has played in the Executive Branch’s prosecution of foreign 
claims under the CCPIA also has been criticized for its lack of transparency and a 
bias towards archaeologists’ interests.70  In 1999 Senator Moynihan attempted to 
 
135.   
 64. See id. at 139 (describing the CCPIA as “the most comprehensive and definitive statement of 
cultural property policy in the United States”).   
 65. Id. at 120.   
 66. See CCPIA, supra note 52.  
 67. See CCPIA, supra note 52, § 2602(a)(1).   
 68. In 2009 the United States accommodated China’s request for the establishment of import 
restrictions on Chinese artifacts, including coins.  The Ancient Coin Collectors Guild challenged the 
legitimacy of these restrictions noting that China’s formal request made no mention of coins, and that 
the State Department fabricated the addition to the request of this category of artifacts.  See Adler & 
Urice, supra note 63, at 158.  See also James Fitzpatrick, Stealth UNIDROIT: Is USIA the Villain?, 31 
NY.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 47, 76 n.88 (1998) (discussing USIA documentation revealing that the USIA 
encouraged Canada to be a “guinea pig” in making the first request under the CCPIA). 
 69. See Bator, supra note 43, at 327–28 (discussing United States objections to a general ban on 
cultural property imports in the initial draft of the UNESCO Convention).  See also Peter Tompa, “The 
Cultural Property Implementation Act: Is it Working?”, CULTURAL PROPERTY OBSERVER, 
http://culturalpropertyobserver.blogspot.com/2011/03/cultural-property-implementation-act-is.html 
[http://perma.cc/7RJ6-YFJX] (noting that “[t]he CPIA was meant to provide a rifle-like response to the 
problems of looting.  Instead, State has used it like a shotgun”).  
 70. See CCPIA, supra note 52, § 2605.  Former members of the CPAC have claimed that the 
State Department has “stacked” the Committee with members with an archaeological bias, and perceives 
the Committee as a rubber stamp for the Department’s pre-determined policy.  See Tompa, supra note 
69.  Moreover, after the publication of an exposé alleging the CPAC’s dereliction of its statutory 
mandate, “the State Department perversely responded by eliminating transparency with respect to its 
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reform the CCPIA, and thereby “clean up” the CPAC, but his proposed legislation 
gained no traction in Congress.71  The current placement of the CPAC in a mid-tier 
State Department bureau belies Congress’ grander intentions for the CCPIA as the 
principal instrument by which to implement United States’ foreign cultural 
property policy worldwide.72  Given that several administrative layers separate the 
bureau from the Secretary of State, let alone the President, it is only reasonable to 
assume that the recommendations of the bureau—and, therefore, the CPAC that 
serves it—will accommodate the broader policies and interests established by these 
supervisory strata. 
The State Department has made cultural property claims “a palpable element of 
public diplomacy,” and thereby heightened public awareness of source nations’ 
cultural property repatriation claims against the United States.73  Given the 
Executive Branch’s readiness to accommodate foreign requests for import 
restrictions under the CCPIA, and its prosecution under domestic law of foreign 
cultural property claims, it appears that it may view foreign cultural property 
complaints primarily as opportunities to generate goodwill, and to promote United 
States interests abroad in unrelated areas like immigration, military installations, 
terrorism, and drug smuggling.74 
 
implementation of the CCPIA[,]” an action that “borders on lawlessness.”  Adler & Urice, supra note 
63, at 146–147 (citing James F. Fitzpatrick, Stealth UNIDROIT: Is USIA the Villain?, 31 N.Y.U. J. Int’l 
L. & Pol. 47 (1998)).  
 71. Cultural Property Procedural Reform Act, S. 1696, 106th Cong. (1999).  Promoting the 
legislation, Senator Schumer argued, “We are introducing legislation that is intended to clean up the 
CPAC—to  make the process open, fair, transparent, and accountable . . . .  The need for cloak and 
dagger, spy vs. spy, CIA level secrecy over the importance of Peruvian pottery escapes me.”  145 CONG. 
REC. 24. 139 (1999) (statement of Sen. Schumer). 
 72. U.S. Department of State Organization Chart, STATE.GOV, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/
dos/99494.htm [http://perma.cc/76R8-WWH9] (last visited Oct. 13, 2015).  The CPAC was originally 
administered by the United States Information Agency (USIA).  When the USIA was dissolved in 1999, 
CPAC was placed under the auspices of the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs. 
 73. Maria P. Kouroupas, Preservation of Cultural Heritage: A Tool of International Public 
Diplomacy, in CULTURAL HERITAGE ISSUES: THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST, COLONIZATION AND 
COMMERCE 325 (James Nafziger & Ann Nicgorski eds., 2009). 
 74. See EFRAT, supra note 37, at 141–42 (discussing opposition to the United States’ accession to 
the UNESCO Convention by art dealers who claimed this action would enable State Department 
accommodations that would be given “as a sop to any Third World nation for more immediate important 
goals, trade goals, such as oil or arms”).  But see Asif Efrat, Protecting Against Plunder: The United 
States and the International Efforts Against Looting of Antiquities 23 (Cornell Law Faculty Working 
Papers, Paper No. 47, 2009), http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers/47/ [http://perma.cc/5X29-
EUTB] (opining that the “primary motivation underlying the US support for protecting archaeology 
through international regulation was not self interest . . . .  Rather, the American goal was to help foreign 
countries protect their archaeological heritage.”).  See also Bator, supra note 43, at 282 n.16 
(discussing the State Department’s establishment in 1969 of a panel to investigate the political and legal 
problems stemming from the illicit antiquities market).  See also William G. Pearlstein, Cultural 
Property, Congress, the Courts, and Customs: The Decline and Fall of the Antiquities Market?, in WHO 
OWNS THE PAST? CULTURAL POLICY, CULTURAL PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 11, 12–13 (Kate Fitz 
Gibbon ed., 2005) (noting that there is no incentive for the United States “to tolerate, much less 
promote, the importation of cultural property if the result would be to antagonize foreign governments 
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The pursuit of foreign cultural property claims against Unites States entities by 
the Departments of State and Justice may have obtained cooperation abroad on 
other national concerns, but arguably it also has had deleterious consequences for 
the United States antiquities market, as well as domestic museums and the national 
and international visitors that frequent them.  In this respect cultural property 
claims by source nations that may be too readily accommodated by the United 
States are akin to brood parasites capitalizing on the indifference or nescience of a 
host, that have the potential insidiously to sap the vitality and growth of American 
collections and expertise in a wide range of cultural and archaeological fields.75 
In a number of recent cases, the United States Government has, at the behest of 
a foreign nation, compelled its own citizens to forfeit objects that they acquired 
abroad in good faith.76  In the most portentous of these cases—United States v. An 
Antique Platter of Gold—authorities in the United States acceded to a request by 
the Italian government for the confiscation without remuneration of a fourth-
century Greek gold platter owned by an American collector.77 
When the owner of the object challenged the confiscation, the Second Circuit 
upheld the district court’s determination that the Government’s seizure was legally 
justified.78  The district court based the legitimacy of the seizure on its assumption 
that the artifact was stolen simply because it was considered so in Italy, under a 
1939 Italian statute asserting state ownership over such objects.79  The case can be 
read, therefore, as precedent effectively warranting prosecution by the United 
States of foreign demands for any object of cultural property over which the 
claimant nation asserts ownership.80 
The Executive Branch’s growing record of prosecutorial activity involving 
cultural property claims by foreign states has made dealers and museums in the 
United States skittish about transactions involving antiquities.81  The Government’s 
pursuit of foreign cultural property claims since the 1970s has not, however, 
 
that might, in consequence, withhold cooperation on matters of greater concern to the US government . . 
. .”).  See also Adler & Urice, supra note 63, at 161 (claiming that the State Department has distorted the 
purpose of the CCPIA by using it not to assist foreign nations with protection of their cultural artifacts, 
but rather “for more self-serving purposes, such as securing long-term loans and unrelated diplomatic 
concessions”). 
 75. See Pearlstein, supra note 74, at 10–11.  
 76. See Adler & Urice, supra note 63, at 125 (discussing government-compelled forfeitures in 
disputes involving various antiquities and a French automobile).  
 77. 991 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).   
 78. United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 79. An Antique Platter of Gold, 991 F. Supp. at 231. 
 80. See Pearlstein, supra note 74, at 25.   
 81. See Pearlstein, supra note 74, at 26.  See also Carol Kino, Trading Places, SLATE (July 28, 
2003), http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/culturebox/2003/07/trading_places.html [http://perma.cc/JJ9Q-
4QHT] (noting that the United States has become an attractive venue for foreign cultural property 
claimants by accommodating them in its courts).  See also Tom Mashberg & Graham Bowley, Islamic 
State Destruction Renews Debate Over Repatriation of Antiquities, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2015, at C1, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/arts/design/islamic-state-destruction-renews-debate-over-
repatriation-of-antiquities.html (quoting Timothy Potts, director of the Getty Museums: “It has become 
an article of faith that any form of trade in cultural items is bad.”).   
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effected the ostensible goal of these efforts to ameliorate the looting and sale of 
source nation antiquities.82 
It may, in fact, have exacerbated the problem.  Since 2001, when the United 
States entered into a bilateral agreement with Italy to impose broad import 
restrictions on antiquities, the volume of Italian antiquities appearing in the market 
has increased significantly.83  This indicates that the United States import 
restrictions have not effected a diminishment in the trafficking of antiquities, but 
rather a shift in the market destinations of these goods.  While museums may now 
avoid purchasing and publicly displaying objects that might prompt scrutiny or 
seizure by the Executive Branch, these items will simply be discreetly transferred 
among private parties, and kept well out of public view.84 
The Executive Branch’s prosecution of foreign cultural property claims has also 
generated widespread cynicism as to the ethics of museums and individual 
collectors of antiquities in the United States.85  Within this atmosphere of mistrust, 
United States museums have been pressured to give objects, without compensation, 
to foreign governments based on assertions of ownership that were never tested in a 
court of law.86  It has also prompted extravagant sanctimonies, like a Denver 
museum’s recent unsolicited delivery of African tribal works to the government of 
Kenya, and Boston Museum of Fine Arts’ establishment of a “curator of 
provenance.”87 
 
 82. See Alexander A. Bauer, New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical 
Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade Debates, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 690, 694–95 (2008) (noting that 
even one of the loudest opponents of the antiquities market acknowledges that looting and destruction of 
archaeological sites has worsened since the establishment of the UNESCO Convention).  
 83. See Gordon Lobay, Border Controls in Market Countries as Disincentives to Antiquities 
Looting at Source?, in CRIMINOLOGY AND ARCHAEOLOGY 75 (Simon Mackenzie & Penny Green eds., 
2009).  See also Podesta, supra note 40, at 464 (claiming United States implementation of the UNESCO 
Convention by which “only one party is punished for the wrongs of multiple partners in crime has no 
negligible impact on those escaping punishment.  It simply encourages their continued wrongdoing[;]” 
and that “placing all responsibility on the receivers of illicit goods will . . . only send the market further 
underground”). 
 84. See Jordana Hughes, The Trend Towards Liberal Enforcement of Repatriation Claims in 
Cultural Property Disputes, 33 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 131, 133 (2000) (arguing that absolute 
prohibition on the transfer of cultural artifacts inflates prices for these materials and thereby encourages 
black market transactions).  See also EFRAT, supra note 37, at 145 (noting that the American 
Association of Museum Directors has established that unilateral imposition of import restrictions by the 
United States has not checked looting, but has simply re-routed the trade in looted objects to other 
market countries).   
 85. See Mashberg & Bowley, supra note 81 (noting that collectors who balk at the current 
orthodoxy surrounding repatriation have been “attacked as apologists for colonialism and ‘cultural 
racketeering’”).   
 86. One of the best known of the many examples of such capitulation is the Metropolitan 
Museum’s giving to the Italian Government in 2008, its Euphronios Krater.  See Michael Kimmelman, 
Stolen Beauty: A Greek Urn’s Underworld, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2009, at C1, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/08/arts/design/08abroad.html (noting that upon the urn’s public 
installation in Rome that the “Italians didn’t seem to care much . . . .  The media mostly gave the event a 
pass.  The gallery was empty the other afternoon”).   
 87. See Geoff Edgers, A Detective’s Work at the MFA, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 11, 2011, at N1, 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/arts/2011/12/11/detective-work-
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The Executive Branch has justified its capitulations to foreign requests for 
import restrictions on cultural property with assurances that these were provided 
only in exchange for pledges by claimant nations that they would loan significant 
cultural artifacts to American museums. 88  These pledges, however, as well as 
commitments by source nations to improve the security and preservation of 
archaeological sites in exchange for unilateral action by the United States 
Government, have proven to be hollow.  For instance, the Italian government has 
ignored a commitment to long-term loans of cultural objects that it made under the 
2001 agreement by which the United States promulgated import restrictions on an 
enormous range of Italian cultural objects.89 
The Executive Branch’s aggressive prosecution of foreign claims of title to 
cultural objects owned by United States entities may have generated good will 
overseas by flattering the amour propre of the governments of source nation 
claimants, but it has not decreased the looting and sale of antiquities worldwide.90  
Moreover, any good will that this accommodation may have fostered abroad must 
be discounted by international resentment fomented by demonstrations of woeful 
indifference to the preservation of cultural property attendant to United States 
military interventions abroad, like that most recently in Iraq.91 
Underlying United States cultural property policy, and all of the foreign claims 
for the repatriation of cultural artifacts that have driven its development, is “the 
stubbornness of objects.”92  Cultural objects are “stubborn” because we regard 
 
mfa/6iaei4YOQOj83s9u3YfDXO/story.html.  See also Tom Mashberg, Sending Artworks Home, but to 
Whom?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 4, 2014, at C1, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/04/arts/design/denver-
museum-to-return-totems-to-kenyan-museum.html (the objects are tribal artifacts, but were given to the 
National Museums of Kenya that has no idea which one of the many nomadic tribes produced a 
particular piece among the group of works given them).   
 88. See, e.g., Katherine Jane Hurst, The Empty(ing) Museum: Why a 2001 Agreement Between the 
United States and Italy is Ineffective in Balancing the Interests of the Source Nation with the Benefits of 
Museum Display, 11 ART ANTIQUITY & L. 55, 74 (2006) (discussing the limitations with the loans 
prompted by the 2001 United States-Italy bilateral agreement and suggesting changes to same). 
 89. See Statement of the Association of Museum Directors Concerning the Proposed extension of 
the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of Italy Concerning the Imposition of Import Restrictions on Categories of 
Archaeological Material Representing the Pre-Classical, Classical, and Imperial Roman Periods of 
Italy, as Amended, MEETING OF THE CULTURAL PROPERTY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (Apr. 8, 2015) 
(noting the deterioration of Italy’s efforts to protect its cultural patrimony as required by the Cultural 
Property Implementation Act, and Italy’s non-compliance with its obligations under the MOU to lend 
cultural works to United States museums).  See also Kaywin Feldman, Director and President of the 
Minneapolis Institute of Arts, Statement to the Cultural Property Advisory Committee Regarding the 
Interim Review of the Italian Memorandum of Understanding, at 3 (Nov. 13, 2009), 
http://aamd.org/advocacy/documents/TestimonytoCPAC110909.pdf  (“We have found almost no 
evidence of long-term loans to large [American] museums, except for the institutions that have 
individual agreements resulting from the transfer of works.  The Italian loans made as a result of 
American museums transferring objects to Italy are not truly long-term loans since these loans are not 
made to satisfy Article II of the MOU, but instead to satisfy an agreement with an individual museum.”).  
 90. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.  
 91. See generally LAWRENCE ROTHFIELD, THE RAPE OF MESOPOTAMIA: BEHIND THE LOOTING 
OF THE IRAQ MUSEUM (2008).   
 92. See Donadio, supra note 18 (quoting James Cuno of The Getty). 
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them as sui generis artifacts of human expression, typically manifest in a single 
rendering.  By anthropomorphizing cultural artifacts, we indicate our perception of 
each object as unique and irreplaceable, like a human life.  If, however, we were to 
consider cultural objects as unique but replaceable (i.e. replicable) works, much of 
the emotional encumbrances that accompany disputes over the possession of these 
works would dissipate.  Digital technologies hold the potential to enable such a 
change in perspective. 
II.  CULTURAL PROPERTY AS INFORMATION 
A.  ELEMENTS OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 
In the digital age it is increasingly true that the economic and aesthetic value of 
a cultural artifact is generated more by the information it contains than by the 
substance in which it is embodied.93  The less valuable an object’s material is, the 
more its worth depends upon metaphysical attributes—and vice-versa.94  A marble 
carving from Antiquity, for instance, is exponentially more valuable, economically 
and aesthetically, than a chunk of marble of equal age used as a curbstone in 
Athens today.  However, a jeweled necklace from Antiquity might not sell for 
vastly more than a contemporary setting of the same quality gems and metals. 
Creators of cultural artifacts tend to use valuable materials to create objects that 
display high quotients of intellectual investment.  Valuable materials like precious 
metals tend to be rare and durable.  These are, obviously, desirable qualities to 
those who invest mental and physical effort in fashioning tangible materials into 
lasting artifacts.  In fact, objects made of the most precious materials retain much of 
their worth even if they are stripped of the intellectual effort invested in their 
creation.95 
We have, therefore, typically fewer qualms about re-setting the precious stones 
comprising a piece of antique jewelry than we have about modifying a bronze or 
wood sculpture from the same era.  This is because the value of the materials in the 
 
 93. “[D]espite its obvious vulnerability, impermanence, and unequal access by digital heritage 
source nations and digital heritage consuming nations, the economic value of information about cultural 
property has become enormously greater than the value of the cultural property itself . . . .  In an effort to 
secure the economic future of nations, institutions, and collectivities of all kinds, the data tail now wags 
the cultural property dog.”  See Neil A. Silberman, From Cultural Property to Cultural Data: The 
Multiple Dimensions of “Ownership” in a Global Digital Age, 21 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 365, 368–
70 (2014).   
 94. This is true not only of original expression but also useful products.  The ingredients that 
comprise a new pharmaceutical, for example, may have little value until they are compounded according 
to a specific formula that may have a great deal of value, and that may have taken years and millions of 
dollars to develop.  This investment, and typically substantial profit, is recovered by the developer of the 
formula that monopolizes the production and sale of the pharmaceutical for the term of the formula’s 
patent.   
 95. Precious materials may, however, be stripped of their worth by becoming less rare.  The value 
of naturally occurring pearls, for instance, plummeted once it became relatively easy to produce cultured 
pearls that are indistinguishable from their naturally occurring counterparts.  See generally STEPHEN G. 
BLOOM, TEARS OF MERMAIDS: THE SECRET STORY OF PEARLS (2009).   
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jewelry runs less risk of being compromised—and might even be increased—by an 
updated working.  By the same measure, we are particularly aghast at the 
obliteration of the intellectual investment in a tangible substance—like a carving at 
the Acropolis or a bronze by Henry Moore—when the value of the work is almost 
entirely independent of that of its material.96 
Tangible works of cultural property are also visible, and meant to be perceived, 
appreciated, and understood mainly through sight.97  Unlike cultural artifacts like 
cuisine, music, and dance, works of cultural property do not require intermediating 
agents to render them perceptible.  These cultural artifacts are, therefore, less 
mutable and fungible, but also more fragile, than non-tangible cultural artifacts.  
While, for instance, there are many different and equally valuable renderings of the 
Greek dish moussaka, there is only one Greek Venus de Milo.  As a purely 
intangible cultural artifact, moussaka is non-rivalrous.  On the other hand, given its 
physicality, most of the Venus de Milo’s economic value resides in the single 
original work that is now in the Louvre. 
B.  THE AURA OF CULTURAL ARTIFACTS 
Cultural property’s dependence on materiality prompts consideration of its  
metaphysical attributes.  Walter Benjamin famously observed, “Even the most 
perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its presence in time 
and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to be.”98  Benjamin 
identified this phenomenon as the “aura” of the original.99  The aura often 
determines the worth ascribed to an object as much as, if not more than, the 
combined value of the material of which it is composed and the intellectual effort 
invested in shaping it. 
We revere the Parthenon not only for its aesthetic and historical values but also 
because the building and its decoration are very old.  We cherish, in a manner akin 
to ancestor worship, the fact that objects we behold today were touched over 2000 
years ago by individuals of an ancient civilization that profoundly affected the 
development of our own.  We anthropomorphize such objects—“if these stones 
could speak”—according them the same reverential deference we accord to aged 
individuals because of all they have experienced, and their capacity to withstand 
the vagaries of an indifferent world for a long time.100 
 
 96. See David Itzkoff, Missing Moore Sculpture May Have Been Sold for Scrap, N.Y. TIMES 
ARTSBEAT (May 19, 2009, 11:45 AM), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/19/missing-moore-
sculpture-may-have-been-sold-for-scrap/ (reporting that, in 2005, an abstract bronze sculpture by Henry 
Moore worth several million dollars was stolen and sold for $2,300 as scrap metal).  
 97. This is especially true today given museums’ practice of keeping visitors at arm’s length from 
displayed works and, in many cases, putting works behind glass so visitors cannot touch them or even 
breathe upon them.   
 98. See Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in 
ILLUMINATIONS 3 (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans., 1969).   
 99. Id. at  4. 
 100. In the case of the Parthenon, some believe the stones do speak, or at least cry.  See supra note 
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An object’s aura and associated economic and psychic worth may be enhanced 
not only by its age but also by the identity of its creator.  We know little of the 
identities, and nothing of the personalities, of the individuals who sculpted the 
Parthenon marbles; the age alone of these objects imbues them with a powerful 
aura.  The aura and financial value of amateur paintings by Adolf Hitler and 
Winston Churchill, on the other hand, are grounded entirely in the identities and 
notorious personalities of their creators.101  Moreover, the more a creator of a work 
is associated with a particular nationality the more likely that the work will be 
perceived as an artifact of national cultural heritage.  Therefore, while England 
proudly promotes Churchill’s third-rate watercolors, Germany and Austria are 
mortified by the irrepressible interest in, and acquisition of, similar dross by its 
erstwhile Führer.102 
Human relics are an extreme illustration of the importance of human connection 
to the development of the aura of a work of cultural property.  Encountering a tooth 
or the facial hair of someone who died over a thousand years ago would likely elicit 
a frisson of ghoulish repugnance unless one believed that these objects were, for 
instance, once body parts of Buddha and Mohammed, respectively.103  Despite the 
fact that no intellectual effort was invested in the creation of Buddha’s tooth or 
Mohammed’s beard, each object has considerable psychic and economic worth 
stemming from its aura, particularly to Buddhists and Moslems respectively.  
Neither object has any utility, aesthetic, or informational value; their worth is based 
entirely upon belief that they are human remains of particular individuals and 
cannot, therefore, be replicated, nor can any other objects replace them. 
C.  DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES CHALLENGE AURA 
It is increasingly possible to produce exact replicas of objects of cultural 
property using digital technologies, but neither these, nor any other technology, 
reproduce the aura of these objects.  This is because auras, while attributed to 
physical objects, have no physical manifestations.  They are entirely mental 
constructs of information, feeling, and belief.  As such, auras have been ascribed to 
innumerable tangible objects, ranging from a Mexican peasant’s cloak imbued with 
an image of the Virgin Mary in the 1500s to a silkscreen of Jackie O stamped out 
 
23.   
 101. Hitler’s and Churchill’s paintings are surprisingly similar topically and stylistically.  Both 
politicians created representational and sentimental pictures of landscapes, monuments, churches, etc.   
 102. See James McDonald, Churchill Beats Hitler at Another Game, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1943, at 
SM8.  See also Frank Simon, German Auction House Putting Hitler Watercolor on Market, REUTERS 
(Nov. 19, 2014, 9:50 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/19/us-germany-hitler-painting-
idUSKCN0J220M20141119 [http://perma.cc/8RT6-GFDR] (discussing the auction house’s response to 
criticism that it is tasteless to auction Hitler’s works, “generally considered to be of limited artistic 
merit”).  
 103. The tooth, preserved in the improbably named city of Kandy in Sri Lanka, and the beard, are 
among the most revered religious relics.  See Kayla Webley, Something to Remember Me By, TIME 
MAGAZINE (Apr. 19, 2010), 
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1983194_1983193_1983101,00.html.   
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by Andy Warhol’s factory in the 1960s. 
Indistinguishable replicas of cultural property objects do, however, challenge the 
significance we ascribe to the auras of the originals.  If human eyes cannot 
distinguish, for instance, between the Getty’s “Victorious Athlete” and a bronze 
copy of it, why should we place greater value on the earlier object simply because it 
was submerged in the Aegean Sea for 2000 years?104  The Aegean Sea is full of 
naturally occurring rocks that have been there for millions of years, but they are not 
more valuable than less-aged rocks of similar molecular composition that one 
might find elsewhere.  This is because none of these naturally-occurring rocks 
evince any demonstrable intellectual effort.105  The Getty’s Athlete is more 
valuable than an unshaped chunk of bronze because it manifests the expression of 
its creator, and in the twenty-first century we can increasingly record and reproduce 
that expression exactly. 
Archaeologists stress the potential loss of historical context for, and aesthetic 
appeal of, objects that are removed from their “find-spots.”106  Easily divisible 
works like Gutenberg’s Bibles or Audubon’s Birds suffer similar informational 
losses when they are disbound and their individual pages scattered.  Such removals 
and dismantlings, however, are not categorically damaging to the economic worth, 
and the associated aura, of works of cultural property.  In fact, Gutenberg and 
Audubon’s books may be worth more when dismantled, as was a work by Picasso 
that was cut into small segments and sold as a number of “original” Picassos.”107 
By the same token, the aura of the Getty’s “Aphrodite”—now housed in an 
insignificant museum in a provincial town close to where it was apparently 
excavated in Sicily—was stronger when the statue was housed in palatial quarters 
in Malibu.  The great geographical separation between the statue’s find-spot in 
Sicily and the Getty Villa in Malibu only enhanced our sense of wonderment in 
beholding something massive, yet dramatically beautiful, temporally and 
 
 104. This question is particularly relevant to situations wherein the accretions to the object, 
barnacles, were removed to restore the object as closely as possible to its initial condition.   
 105. The worth of Plymouth Rock, and similar cultural objects bearing no imprint of human 
intelligence, is generated entirely by its aura.  In the case of Plymouth Rock, it is based on the erroneous 
belief that it was the first solid surface the Pilgrims touched when they arrived in America.  See BILL 
BRYSON, MADE IN AMERICA: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2 (1994) (observing that no prudent sailor would bring a ship alongside such a boulder in a 
rough December sea).   
 106. See Tom Lutz, Finding this Lost City in Honduras Was the Easy Part, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 
2015, at A29, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/20/opinion/finding-this-lost-city-in-honduras-was-the-
easy-part.html (noting that archaeologists’ intransigence on the question of moving objects from their 
find spots can leave artifacts more vulnerable to looting).   
 107. See Elizabeth Dillinger, Mutilating Picasso: The Case for Amending the Visual Artist Rights 
Act to Provide Protection of Moral Rights After Death, 75 UMKC L. REV. 897 (2007).  The late Paul 
Bator asserted that “[n]obody would suggest that a painting be cut into pieces in order to make it ‘go 
around’ further, since (like the child in Solomon’s judgment) mutilation destroys the entity . . . .  It is the 
most distasteful aspect of the current art trade that on this question aesthetics and economics sometimes 
part company, and that the physical mutilation of certain types of art is rendered profitable because a 
respectable and lucrative market can be found for fragments no matter how brutally obtained.”  See 
Bator, supra note 43, at 296 (1982).   
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geographically distant from its time and place of creation. 
Three-dimensional scan and print technologies cannot reproduce an original 
object’s aura, but they hold the potential to dilute, or even eviscerate, it.  Imagine 
the Getty’s bronze Athlete standing among a dozen or more visually and haptically 
identical copies of it.  Each additional copy further undermines the legitimacy of 
the aura we ascribe to the original; what does it matter that one of these ten, twenty, 
or thirty bronzes was created 2000 years ago if I cannot identify it among the 
copies?  While one could establish the original by resorting to non-visible or 
intangible evidence, why should such evidence affect the economic and physic 
value of a work that was created to be perceived entirely by human eyes and hands? 
D.  FORGERIES CHALLENGE AURA 
Forgery is like plagiarism in that the copying of the intellectual expression of 
another is done with the intention to deceive others as to the identity of the author 
of the expression in the copy.108  However, the forger hopes that others will believe 
that his copy is the work of a putative original author whereas the plagiarist hopes 
that others will believe that the copy is his work. 
There are well-known examples of forgeries dating from Antiquity; even 
Michelangelo indulged in the practice when it was more profitable to him to tout 
his work as that of a sculptor from the Classical era than that of a little-known 
artist.109  Players in the art market ostentatiously decry forgeries, yet these fakes 
(i.e. the forgeries) have had a salubrious affect in exposing some of the chicanery 
that has long permeated this market.110 
In the early decades of the twentieth century the Dutch artist Han van Meegeren 
painted a number of paintings in the style of Vermeer that he doctored so as to 
make them appear to be three hundred years old.111  He successfully passed off one 
of these forgeries to Hermann Göring, who acquired it in exchange for 200 original 
Dutch paintings that had been expropriated by the Nazis.112 
Today we are astonished that van Meegeren duped Göring, who was a seasoned 
and somewhat discerning collector, because the painting in question appears 
 
 108. Plagiarism and forgery may be unethical but, unlike copyright infringement, they are not 
illegal per se.   
 109. See Aviva Briefel, Sacred Objects/Illusory Idols The Fake in Freud’s “The Moses of 
Michelangelo”, in FAKES AND FORGERIES 27 (Peter Knight & Jonathan Long eds., 2004).   
 110. “The prevalence of fakes is the venereal disorder of the illicit art market—the punishment for 
excessive desire and bad judgment.  When a piece is exposed as a fake, the usual museum practice is to 
hide it away, as if its mere presence would infect the worthier works around it—and in the process, years 
of scholarly labor may be wasted in arguments over the virtue of an object.”  See Meyer, supra note 59, 
at 108.   
 111. See JONATHAN LOPEZ, THE MAN WHO MADE VERMEERS: UNVARNISHING THE LEGEND OF 
MASTER FORGER HAN VAN MEEGEREN (2008). 
 112. At the end of World War II van Meegeren was charged as a Nazi collaborator for having 
traded with Göring for one of his “Vermeers” (called “Christ and the Adulteress”).  Van Meegeren’s 
successful swindle rendered him a hero.  Id. at 1–2. 
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grotesque alongside those long considered genuine Vermeers.113  In fact, van 
Meegeren was more talented in forging attributes of Vermeer’s works—e.g. 
seventeenth-century paint and canvas, as well as colorable and imaginative 
provenances—than he was in imitating Vermeer’s intellectual capacity as conveyed 
in his paintings.114  Moreover, because paintings by Vermeer are so rare, and were 
so prized in the early twentieth century, there was a collective yearning within the 
art world for the discovery of additional works by this artist.  Like Peter Pan’s 
Tinkerbell, the auras of van Meegeren’s forgeries gained strength simply because 
participants in the art market willed it.115 
Göring may have been the most notorious and deserving victim of van 
Meegeren’s deceit, but he was hardly alone.  Prominent art historians, dealers, and 
collectors of the time were also duped by van Meegeren’s work; the Netherlands’ 
Rembrandt Society paid a fortune for one of his forgeries (“Supper at Emmaus”) 
that became the most celebrated piece of Rotterdam’s Boijmans Museum in the 
1930s.116  Once van Meegeren’s fraud had been established, and the unfortunate 
painter incarcerated, his “Vermeers,” some of which had been sold at some of the 
highest prices ever paid for paintings, became virtually worthless overnight.  Their 
economic and historical value has since been based entirely on the fact that they are 
not by Vermeer, but were once thought to have been.117 
E.  THE PARADOX OF AURA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
As copying technologies became increasingly refined and ubiquitous during the 
twentieth century there was a commensurate growth in the value ascribed to the 
aura of original cultural objects.  A manifestation of this development is the 
catalogue raisonné, a purportedly definitive list of all extant works by a particular 
artist.118  These lists provide buyers and sellers a means of distinguishing originals 
from forgeries.  Given, however, that creators of cultural artifacts intend them to be 
appreciated for their expressive content, why should their worth be significantly, if 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. The same is true of Wolfgang Beltracchi, the German forger who created dozens of paintings 
that he sold as originals by important German Expressionist artists.  Despite his boast that he could 
imitate any painter, including Leonardo, Beltracchi appears to have limited his forgeries to artists known 
for nonrepresentational works, a fact that prompts one to wonder whether it is not only easy to copy the 
works of nonrepresentational artists like Max Ernst, but to create them in the first place.  See   
BELTRACCHI: THE ART OF FORGERY (Tradewind Pictures, 2014). 
 115. I borrow the Tinkerbell analogy from Robert Berring, who used it to illustrate how legal 
information resources garner authority.  Robert Berring, Chaos, Cyberspace, and Tradition: Legal 
Information Transmogrified, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 189, 193 (1997).   
 116. LOPEZ, supra note 111, at 140. 
 117. LOPEZ, supra note 111, at 10 (referring to the “Supper at Emmaus” as a “defanged cobra,” 
now merely a source of popular curiosity at the Boijmans Museum).   
 118. “A descriptive catalogue arranged according to subjects, or branches of subjects; hence 
generally or loosely, a classified or methodical list.”  OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://
www.oed.com/view/Entry/28714 [http://perma.cc/9UD4-2379] (last visited Sep. 16, 2015). 
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not entirely, determined by their attribution to specific individuals?119  Likewise, if, 
using unenhanced perceptive capacities, we cannot distinguish between an original 
artifact and a copy, it is irrational to prize the unknown original.120 
The legitimacy of auras associated with twentieth- and twenty-first century 
conceptual and mechanically produced works of art is particularly dubious.  Jeff 
Koons’s balloon sculptures, for instance, evince virtually no original expression, 
but merely the implementation of the concept of rendering already well known 
objects in an unexpected medium.121  Anyone may legally manufacture and sell 
balloon sculptures as long as they are not passed off as having been manufactured 
by Koons. The economic worth of Koons’s balloon sculptures is generated, 
therefore, simply by Koons’s assertion that he authorized their manufacture.  In 
other words: 
What is wrongly so-called “authenticity” is actually the stamp that the artist or his 
legal successor appends on the artwork.  In fact, to be clear, we should not talk about 
an authentic work but an authorized work while making a distinction according to the 
identity of the author of the authorization (either the artist or his legal successor).122 
More questionable, and arguably crasser, than the ascription of auras to 
conceptual and manufactured works is the modern day phenomenon of economic 
capitalization on auras associated not with the creators of objects, but rather their 
owners.  It is salubriously humane to attach an aura of sentimentality to objects 
owned and used by individuals with whom we have had an intimate rapport:  a lock 
of hair, a favorite book, even a piece of furniture.  Ascribing auras, however, to 
objects without utility—not even spiritual potential like that of religious relics—or 
aesthetic significance, simply because they were once owned or used by well-
known and notorious individuals like Jacqueline Onassis, and Lee Harvey Oswald, 
is deplorable in that it puts “you in mind of Christopher Lasch’s definition of the 
clinical narcissist . . . as someone ‘whose sense of self depends on the validation of 
 
 119. See Lorne Manly, Art of a Flip: $5,200 to Millions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2015, at A1 
(discussing the sale of a painting for 1,000 times the price for which it had sold a year earlier, after  it 
had been authenticated as a work of John Constable).   
 120. The irrationality of favoring an original work over its copy is the subject of the Dulwitch 
Gallery (London) 2015 exhibition Made in China: A Doug Fishbone Project, in which visitors are 
challenged to identify a Chinese made copy of one of the Gallery’s Old Master paintings that has been 
substituted for the original.  See also Jason Caffrey, America’s Most Generous Con Artist, BBC WORLD 
SERVICE (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31818367 [http://perma.cc/CZ6T-A79G] 
(discussing Mark Landis’s forgeries of works by well-known artists, which he donated to museums that 
displayed them as genuine works).   
 121. “Why is ‘Balloon Dog,’ the large construction currently atop the Metropolitan Museum roof, 
said to be by Jeff Koons?  Mr. Koons did not conceive the original balloon figure of a dog, nor did he 
create the gigantic finished piece, made by Carlson & Company . . . .  Mr. Koons simply found 
something to duplicate and suggested making it big and shiny.”  Peter E. Rosenblatt, Letter to the Editor, 
Questioning Creativity, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2008, at AR4. 
 122. Jean-Jacques Neuer, What is the Authenticity of a Work of Art in the Era of 3D?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 12, 2015, 5:57PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeanjacques-neuer/the-
authenticity-of-a-work-of-art-in-the-era-of-3d_b_6395958.html [http://perma.cc/2XV3-XPEB]. 
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others whom he nevertheless degrades.’”123 
The significance of aura to the aesthetic and economic valuations of cultural 
artifacts can be diminished only if we perceive cultural artifacts as fundamentally 
works of information rather than tangible relics.  This re-conception, in turn, 
depends on our capacity to capture and recreate exact material renderings of the 
information contained in these objects.  Today’s digital 3D scan and print 
technologies make such material renderings increasingly feasible. 
 
III.  DIGITAL 3D SCAN AND PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGIES 
A.  BEFORE THE DIGITAL ERA 
Since time immemorial humans have copied not only useful and valuable 
tangible objects like tools and coins, but also those of mainly aesthetic content, like 
paintings and statues.  The accuracy of these reproductions has been determined 
both by the complexity of the original works and the technologies used to produce 
the copies.  Ancient Greeks, for instance, could replicate only bronzes, terra cottas, 
and coins, because the only technologies available to them were founding and 
stamping.124 
Unlike works valued primarily for the information they contain—books, music 
scores, blueprints, etc.—it is much more difficult to create copies of three- 
dimensional works of art that possess even a modicum of the economic value of the 
original.  This difficulty stems in part from the fact that technologies enabling the 
mechanical reproduction of a painting by Rembrandt, or a sculpture by Rodin, are 
less advanced than those used to produce copies of literary works or architectural 
drawings.  The difficulty in creating copies that are indistinguishable from original 
sculptures, paintings, etc., in turn, underscores the rarity of the originals and 
thereby boosts their worth. 
Because of the technical obstacles to creating exact copies of three-dimensional 
works of art, reproductions of, for instance, carvings from Antiquity typically have 
not been intended to lead the viewer to believe he is seeing an original work.  
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, aficionados of Classical culture 
commissioned collections of plaster casts of statuary and carvings, particularly of 
works located in Italy and Greece. 125  These casts were not meant to serve as 
 
 123. LEE SIEGEL, AGAINST THE MACHINE 142 (2008).  See also James Barron, ’The Auction 
Aftermath: Was It Worth the Price?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1996, at 35 (noting one dealer’s valuation of 
Jacqueline Onassis’s household effects as “a load of rubbish”).  A funeral home in Fort Worth recently 
attempted to sell the exhumed coffin, in which Lee Harvey Oswald was initially buried, for $87,468.  
David Montgomery, In a Texas Court, a Fight for Lee Harvey Oswald’s Coffin, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 
2014, at A20, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/12/us/in-a-texas-court-a-fight-for-lee-harvey-oswalds-
coffin.html.   
 124. Benjamin, supra note 98, at 218.   
 125. See Lisa Hargrove, et al., The History of Plaster Casts, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY 
HISTORY & ART HISTORY DEPARTMENT, http://chnm.gmu.edu/courses/mattusch/plaster/index_files/
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substitutes for the originals; they had, rather, a pedagogical purpose to provide to 
those living thousands of miles from the sources accurate three-dimensional 
versions of at least the outlines of the stone originals.126  Cast copies were 
relatively inexpensive to produce, and a nineteenth century industry developed to 
provide for domestic delectation of innumerable Greek and Roman statues.127 
Plaster cast copies are made using a simple technology by which a “negative” 
mold is created by surrounding the exterior surface of an object with plaster.128  
The mold is filled with fresh plaster, or a similar liquid substance, which, once 
solid and extracted, displays the same shape as the original.  This technology, 
however, can be used only on three-dimensional objects whose composition will 
not be compromised by being encased in plaster.  Moreover, the material of the 
molds and resulting casts, both typically plaster, limit the fidelity of the copies, 
especially with respect to the colors and textures of the reflective surfaces of the 
original. 
B.  DIGITAL ERA 
The limitations of the relatively low tech, plaster cast approach to 3D copying 
can be overcome, increasingly, by using only information about objects, rather than 
the physical objects themselves.  Artists have, of course, always known that the 
more exhaustive one’s information about an object, the more accurate one’s 
rendering of it.  Michelangelo, for instance, rendered his wax models in stone using 
an ingenious system by which he obtained information on the height, width, and 
depth of the models.129  By placing a wax model in a vessel of water, and gradually 
draining the water, he would record the dimensions of the emerging model—
guided by the plane of water—which would steer his work for the final version in 
stone.  Similarly, the phenomenon of camera obscura (“darkroom”), known since 
Antiquity, enabled artists to trace actual images of objects projected through 
narrow openings into dark spaces.130 
 
Page418.htm [http://perma.cc/W567-QCB6] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015).  See also Pamela Born, Canon 
is Cast: Plaster Casts in American Museum and University Collections, 21  J. ART LIBR. SOC’Y N. AM. 
8, 9–10 (2002) (noting the decline in enthusiasm for plaster casts in the twentieth century).   
 126. In the nineteenth century the Metropolitan Museum, the Louvre, and the British Museum had 
large collections of plaster casts.  However, in the latter part of the twentieth century possession of these 
collections became slightly embarrassing.  Plaster cast collections embodied a heavy pedagogical and 
aspirational message that museums wanted to temper for fear of patronizing their visitors.  They also ran 
the risk of signaling to Italy and Greece a sense of cultural inferiority—after all, Italian and Greek 
museums were not collecting casts of Druid relics or American Indian arrowheads—and only originals 
became worthy of collection and display in the now-glamorous Metropolitan, Louvre, and British 
Museum.   
 127. Some manufacturers offered complementary plaster fig leaves that demure buyers could 
attach to strategic portions of the statues.  Born, supra note 125, at 11.   
 128. See Hargrove, supra note 125.   
 129. See GIORGIO VASARI, THE LIVES OF THE ARTISTS (Julia Conway Bondanella trans., Oxford 
University Press 2008).   
 130. See PICTURING MACHINES 1400–1700 (Wolfgang Lefèvre ed., 2004).   
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In the twenty-first century, 3D scan technology allows one to obtain such 
detailed and precise information about objects that it is increasingly feasible to 
create copies of sculptural works from this information which are indistinguishable 
from even highly faceted and subtly finished originals.  Moreover, this information 
can be obtained with minimal physical contact—or even none, when using passive 
optical devices—by using light waves to measure the typically fragile object.131 
The quality of the copy, or “print,” of the scanned work depends upon the 
granularity of the scan information as well as the precision of the machinery 
reading and rendering this information.132  Most 3D prints are created through an 
additive process that builds an object layer by layer.  3D scans can also be rendered 
through subtractive manufacturing that carves an object from a block of solid 
substance like stone or metal.133 
3D scanners obtain information about the shape, but not the color or reflective 
properties, of the scanned surfaces.  Color sampling technology can be used to 
obtain this information and, combined with that about shape, enable production of a 
colored object that is close in appearance to the original.134  Advancing 
technologies steadily lessen existing limitations for machine capture and 
reproduction of information about color, reflectivity, and tactile qualities of 
surfaces.  These advances make possible, for example, high quality 3D 
reproductions of oil paintings for haptic perception by the blind.135  
Nanotechnologies hold even more astonishing potential for the precise capture and 
replication, at an atomic level, not only of the shape, color, and feel of an object, 
but also the materials of which it is made.136 
Existing technologies permit the manufacture of many three-dimensional 
cultural works—e.g., bronze statuary, stone engravings—which the naked eye 
cannot distinguish from the originals.  Those who copy or restore antiquities, 
however, typically will not employ these technologies to their full reproductive or 
 
 131. See Paolo Cignoni & Roberto Scopigno, Sampled 3D Models for CH Applications: A Viable 
and Enabling New Medium or Just a Technological Exercise?, 1 ACM J. ON COMPUTING & CULTURAL 
HERITAGE 2:1, 2:3 (2008). 
 132. It is even possible to create a 3D scan of a long-playing sound recording (“LP” or “vinyl”) 
that accurately replicates not only the shape of the original LP, but also the sound waves etched into its 
grooves.  Joren De Wachter, 3D Printing and Intellectual Property, TRADESECRETSLAW.COM (Jan. 21, 
2013), http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2013/01/articles/trade-secrets/3d-printing-and-intellectual-
property [http://perma.cc/8ZB6-EJUW].  
 133. For an example of a practical implementation of this technology see, e.g., Lithias: Pierre, Art 
& Ornements Exceptionnels, http://www.lithias.fr/sauvegarde-3D.html [http://perma.cc/R2DH-7FAW]   
(last visited Sep. 29, 2015). 
 134. Cignoni and Scopigno, in their discussion of the potential of digital technologies for the 
reproduction of works of cultural heritage, found that although color is a vital component of most of 
these visual works, the available technology to record information on the color of a work is not as 
advanced as that used to record information on its shape.  Cignoni & Scopigno, supra note 131, at 2:4. 
 135. See Raphael Minder, Unlocking Sight, With Touch, at the Prado, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2015, 
at C1, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/07/arts/design/at-museo-del-prado-blind-visitors-can-touch-
masterpieces.html. 
 136. See generally K. ERIC DREXLER, ENGINES OF CREATION 2.0: THE COMING ERA OF 
NANOTECHNOLOGY (2006).   
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restorative capacity.  Aesthetic, economic, and political interests underlie this 
reluctance.137  Athens’s Acropolis Museum provides an example of such political 
motivations.  The museum houses decorative sculpture from the Parthenon, 
including sections of the frieze of the Panathenaic Procession, much of which is 
now in the British Museum.138  Early in the twenty-first century the frieze carvings 
remaining on the Parthenon were removed to the Acropolis Museum and replaced 
on the temple with copies manufactured using 3D scans of the originals.139  
Juxtaposed with the warm and weathered surfaces of the original frieze segments, 
the chalky plaster prints appear spectral and impermanent, a phenomenon 
capitalized upon by the campaign calling for the British Museum to return the 
“missing” portions of the frieze to Athens.140 
Given the perception of tangible works of cultural property, whether Classical 
marble sculptures or contemporary metallic balloon animals, as essentially works 
of information, the replication of these works, and particularly the mechanical 
production of exact copies, implicates intellectual property concerns.  Given that 
the fundamental purpose of 3D scanning and print technologies is the creation of 
identical copies of existing objects, through use of information about their 
composition these technologies commingle patent, trade dress, and copyright 
issues. 
IV.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IMPLICATIONS OF 3D 
TECHNOLOGIES 
A.  PATENT AND TRADE DRESS 
If I invent a newfangled citrus reamer and am granted a utility patent based upon 
some improvement it brings to pre-existing reamers, for twenty years no one may 
legally replicate this utensil without my authorization.141  The unauthorized 
scanning and printing of my patented object for market distribution would clearly 
undermine my economic interests and constitute patent infringement.  If the reamer 
were not sufficiently novel or useful to obtain a utility patent, it still might be 
protected for fourteen years under a design patent.142  This protection would also 
proscribe scanning and printing the reamer, even if done in the privacy of one’s 
 
 137. See infra note 160 and accompanying text for a discussion of these aesthetic and economic 
concerns.  
 138. See The Frieze, ACROPOLIS MUSEUM http://www.theacropolismuseum.gr/en/content/frieze-0 
[http://perma.cc/6U4P-MJDT] (last visited Oct. 7. 2015).  
 139. Id.   
 140. The Acropolis Museum has also used digital technology to recreate the original appearance—
albeit only in virtual form—of the frieze, with colors and metal accouterments like swords and bridles.  
See Chris Leadbeater, Brightening the Past: Acropolis Museum in Athens ‘Restores’ Parthenon Friezes 
to Their Original Colours by Using Digital Technology, DAILY MAIL (July 1, 2014), http://
www.dailymail.co.uk/travel/article-2676413/Athenss-Acropolis-Museum-celebrates-fifth-anniversary-
digital-programme-colour-Parthenon-Marbles.html.   
 141. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).   
 142. See id. §§ 17 and 173.   
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home and for personal use. 
Merely creating an unauthorized 3D scan of a product that is protected by a 
utility or design patent may not appear to threaten financial detriment to the patent 
holder.  Doing so, however, could ultimately constitute an unauthorized and 
detrimental use of the protected invention or design.143  An unauthorized scan of a 
patented object might, for instance, provide those possessing the scanned 
information an unfair lead in the production and sale of the object following the 
termination of its patent protection. 
Unauthorized 3D scanning and printing might also violate a product’s trade 
dress protection.  For example, the distinctive snowman contour of the bottles in 
which POM Wonderful juice is sold does not facilitate the packaging, distribution, 
and consumption of the product and cannot, therefore, be protected by a utility 
patent.  Unauthorized use of the shape in commerce, however, could be proscribed 
through a design patent, or through trade dress protection if consumers associate 
that shape with POM juice.144  Paradoxically, the fact that the snowman shape does 
not enhance the delivery of the product renders it more likely to be associated by 
consumers with a particular brand, and therefore eligible for trade dress protection. 
Creating a 3D scan of an unpatented POM Wonderful bottle does not implicate 
liability for infringement of trade dress because the mere creation of a scan does not 
affect POM’s capacity in the marketplace.145  Using this scan to produce bottles in 
which to sell carrot juice, and certainly pomegranate juice, however, would lead to 
POM’s assertion that use of this scan to package juice constitutes infringement of 
its trade dress.  Use of POM-shaped bottles to package and vend a caustic drain 
cleaner, on the other hand, would likely not provide POM with a colorable 
infringement claim based upon likelihood of confusion as to the source of the 
cleaner, although POM might claim such use constitutes tortious disparagement of 
its juice.146 
B.  COPYRIGHT 
Three-dimensional cans and prints of copyrighted objects—e.g., Barbie dolls—
are both derivative works and copies.147  As such, only the owner of the copyright 
may authorize legitimate creations of either.148  It is more ambiguous, however, 
whether authorized 3D scans and prints of copyrighted objects, or even of works in 
the public domain, might constitute independently copyrightable works. 
 
 143. See id. § 271.   
 144. See Lanham Act § 43(a), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).  
 145. See Joel Reese, Defining the Elements of Trade Dress Infringement Under Section 43(a) of 
the Lanham Act, 2 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 103 (1994) (discussing proximity of the products within the 
market as one of the elements required to obtain trade dress protection, and those needed to establish 
infringement of it).   
 146. See 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 
27:91 (4th ed. 2015). 
 147. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).   
 148. Id. at § 106. 
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The more that the creation of a copy depends upon human perception and 
physical dexterity rather than mechanical processes, the greater the likelihood that 
it will deviate from the original—even if the copyist aspires otherwise—and 
thereby achieve at least the “spark” of creativity prerequisite to obtain copyright 
protection.149  By the same token, the more a copy, or even an original work, is 
produced through mechanical means—photocopier, sound synthesizer, even a 
Spirograph®—the less likely that it will contain copyrightable content.150 
One of the greatest advantages of 3D scans and prints over earlier methods for 
reproducing material objects is the fact that they enable the manufacture of an 
infinite number of copies that so accurately replicate the contour of the original that 
it is difficult to distinguish by sight and feel between the original and the 
reproduction.  This is the same advantage inherent in other digital reproduction 
applications, like audio recordings, in which the fidelity does not decline 
progressively as one reproduces the original. 
Because digital 3D print technologies render highly accurate replications, the 
production of unauthorized 3D prints of copyrighted tangible objects would clearly 
constitute infringement.  The same attribute of accuracy also raises the question, 
however, whether use of this technology to create copies of copyright protected and 
public domain works, regardless of the “sweat of the brow” expended in doing so, 
may generate copyrightable expression.  Two recent federal court cases dealt with 
this issue. 
In Meshwerks v. Toyota the Tenth Circuit addressed the effect of reproductive 
accuracy of 3D scans and print technology on copyright eligibility.151  Toyota’s 
advertising agency had commissioned Meshwerks to create 3D scans of several of 
its automobile models.  Toyota used these scans in more than one advertising 
campaign, prompting Meshwerks’s claim that any use of the scans beyond the 
single initial television ad they had anticipated in creating them, infringed their 
copyright.152 
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Toyota, having determined that Meshwerks’s scans were not copyrightable 
expression.153  The court noted that while Meshwerks had spent hundreds of hours 
creating the scans, this work involved manipulating measurement data to render a 
digital wire-frame that would appear to be an even more exact copy of the model 
than otherwise.154  This expenditure of time and skill, therefore, worked against 
Meshwerks’s copyright claim because the intent of this investment was to enable 
 
 149. See Feist Publ’ns. Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (identifying 
originality, at least a “spark” of creativity, as the sine qua non of copyright protection).  
 150. The Spirograph, a toy popular in the 1970s, enabled drawing of geometric patterns using 
gears.  See WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spirograph (last visited Oct. 7, 2015).  
 151. Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2008).   
 152. Meshwerks’s connection with the deep-pocketed defendant Toyota was highly attenuated.  
Saatchi & Saatchi, Toyota’s ad agency, subcontracted a portion of its Toyota work to a smaller agency 
that, in turn, subcontracted the 3D scanning work to Meshwerks.  Id. at 1260. 
 153. Id. at 1261, 1270. 
 154. Id. at 1268–69.   
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replication of the intellectual expression, and only that expression, created and 
owned by another.155 
The court emphasized that its determination that the Meshwerks’s 3D scans 
were not copyrightable expression was not influenced by the fact that the works in 
question were generated through a relatively new, and highly mechanical, 
technology.  “A Luddite might make the mistake of suggesting that digital 
modeling, as was once said of photography, allows for nothing more than 
‘mechanical reproduction . . . and involves no originality of thought . . . .’  Clearly, 
this is not so.”156 
Two years after Meshwerks, in a dispute involving 3D prints of model railroad 
components, a federal district court in Missouri heeded the Tenth Circuit’s caution 
that use of “mechanical reproduction” technologies does not preclude the 
generation of copyrightable expression. 157  Like the 3D scans of automobiles 
created by Meshwerks, those created by the plaintiff in Osment Models were based 
on non-copyrightable works:  existing railway and filling stations at various 
locations in the United States. 
Like Meshwerks, Osment, in developing his 3D scans and prints of these 
buildings, manipulated some of the digital information collected from the scanned 
full-scale building models.  Unlike Meshwerks, however, Osment adjusted this 
information—using “selective compression”—to create an object that would look 
somewhat different from the model when deployed in the toy railroad.158  Osment 
also added to his 3D models a number of original features—colors, signage, and 
design details—to evoke the actual buildings but not slavishly replicate identifying 
details of their appearance.159 
The Osment court determined that these additions met copyright’s requirement 
for a “spark” of original expression, having made it a question of fact whether the 
model was sufficiently original.  Therefore, the plaintiff’s particular combinations 
of public domain and original information could not be legitimately copied without 
his authorization.160  From Osment we learn that the more exact an unauthorized 
3D rendering is of a copyrighted work, the greater the likelihood that the 
reproduction is infringing.  From Meshworks, on the other hand, we learn that the 
more exact an authorized 3D reproduction is of a copyrighted or public domain 
work, the less likely that the reproduction constitutes copyrightable expression. 
C.  COPYRIGHT, 3D TECHNOLOGIES, AND PUBLIC DOMAIN WORKS 
The goal of most initiatives to create 3D scans and prints of antiquities and 
 
 155. Toyota designers created the designs, and design patents owned by Toyota protected the 
automobiles at issue in this case.  See id. at 1266, 1268.   
 156. Id. at 1269 (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithograph Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884)).  
 157. Osment Models, Inc. v. Mike’s Train House, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-04189-NKL, 2010 WL 
5423740, at *6 (W. Dist. Mo. Dec. 27, 2010) (citing Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 126). 
 158. See id. at *2, 6–7.   
 159. Id. at *7. 
 160. Id. at *7.   
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works of visual art is to produce the most accurate copies possible of objects in 
their current state.  Computer assisted design (CAD) and 3D scan technologies 
make it possible to create a version of the Venus de Milo with arms and an 
unblemished face, which more closely resembles the work in its original state over 
2000 years ago than does the damaged original in the Louvre.  Such a rendition, 
however, would have less economic and aesthetic value today than an exact replica 
of the armless and nicked original because we consider such restorations to be 
presumptuous and vulgar.161 
Paradoxically, as technologies have enabled the production of ever more 
accurate copies of original works, we have become increasingly disdainful toward 
reproductions and restorations of these works that vary from the original and 
contain information or materials added by the copyist or restorer.  This disdain has 
led to absurdities like Congress’ considering in 1987 whether colorization of black 
and white movies should be deemed illegal, or Schadenfreude-engendering 
vignettes in which hopeful participants in Antique Roadshow learn that their 
meticulously refinished Queen Anne highboy, which represents the work in its 
original condition, would have been worth twice as much if it had been left wearing 
its now crazed and shabby—but original—lacquer. 
It is typically more difficult to make a copy or restoration that faithfully 
represents the intentions of the author of a public domain work than it is to adhere 
to those of the author of a copyrighted work.  This is because the longer the period 
between the original appearance of a work and the subsequent effort to copy or 
restore it, the greater the work’s accumulation of content that was unintended by its 
original creator.  These accretions can be as irrelevant as the barnacles covering the 
Getty’s Victorious Youth when it was fished from the Aegean, or as exquisitely 
complementary as a cadenza that Beethoven wrote to be inserted into a concerto by 
Mozart, which is still widely performed today.162 
Restoring a public domain work to its original reification, whether an ancient 
bronze or a score by Mozart, requires time and intellectual application, but these 
investments yield no copyrightable interest to those making them, at least under 
United States law.163  In fact, the more accurate the restoration, the more likely the 
work will manifest nothing other than the expression of the original creator, long in 
the public domain. 
The fact that no copyright protection exists for the vast majority of objects we 
consider cultural property is an inconvenient fact for those hoping to capitalize 
 
 161. Aggressive restoration—e.g., enriching faded color, adding lost appendages like digits and 
noses of statuary—might produce a more accurate version of the creator’s intent than does a timid 
restoration whose maker dares not presume to know what the author intended.   
 162. Heard at the end of a concerto movement, aria, etc., cadenzas provide the soloist an 
opportunity to display improvisational and technical facility.  See “cadenza”, OXFORD COMPANION TO 
MUSIC (online ed., 2011); LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN, KADENZEN UND EINGÄNGE ZU 
KLAVIERKONZERTEN (Henle ed., 2012).   
 163. German copyright law, on the other hand, provides a twenty-five year term of “neighboring 
rights” protection to publishers of public domain works.  See Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG] [Copyright 
law], BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBI. I] 51, § 71 (Sept. 9, 1965) (Ger).   
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financially upon their physical possession of these items.  Before cameras became 
portable consumer products, museums could monopolize the market for 
reproductions of works in their collections by limiting physical access to them. 
Today, however, museum visitors need not exit through the gift shop to buy two-
dimensional reproductions of public domain works they have just seen; they have 
already recorded these on their smart phones. 
Equally vexing to those seeking to capitalize on their possession of cultural 
artifacts is the potential of 3D technologies to undermine not only the financial 
benefit stemming from monopolistic control of the market for 3D replicas of these 
objects but also the economic potential of the original object.164  If I can view in 
Los Angeles a 3D replica of Michelangelo’s David that is visibly indistinguishable 
from the statue in Italy, why should I incur the expense of travelling to Florence, 
and paying a fee to the Italian government, specifically to see the original?165 
Digital technologies now threaten to undermine the economic potential of 
cultural artifacts like Michelangelo’s David much as they have undercut profits 
from the producers of cultural artifacts like Hollywood movies and Silicon Valley 
software.  Movies and software whose earnings have been sapped by unauthorized 
copying, however, involve the interests of living creators or direct descendants and 
are protected by copyright.  There are no such lingering interests, on the other hand, 
in the case of Michelangelo or any of the creators of innumerable excavated and 
still buried cultural artifacts in Italy, whose works are in the public domain. 
Those who possess the originals of cultural artifacts in the public domain may 
still attempt to capitalize on their controlling access to them.  These owners may 
also impose contractual limits on those who obtain access to the works, on use of 
information about, and copies of, the objects.  In short, although technology may be 
transforming our perception of these objects into intangible works of unprotected 
information, owners of the objects may still capitalize on this public domain 
information by resorting to legal protections for tangible property in which this 
information is contained.166 
 
 164. In a similar vein, to obtain the greatest profit, artists who make multiple copies of a work—
like Rodin, or the creators of “numbered” prints—balance the potential proceeds they will make by 
selling a large number of copies against that generated from the sale of a small number whose value is 
enhanced by exclusivity and scarcity.   
 165. This seems true especially since the original has been relocated from the location in which it 
stood for over 300 years in the Palazzo della Signoria, to the Galleria dell’Accademia.   
 166. “[W]here no labor or creativity whatever is expended, where one is simply the proprietor of 
an artifact that embodies data or ideas of the sort that the courts have so jealously reserved to the public, 
no notion of a public realm exists.  On the contrary, such objects—and, in consequence, what is 
contained within them—are left entirely to the dominion of the owner, with no duty to make them 
accessible to an interested public, or otherwise to protect them.”  JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH 
A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES 3 (1999).   
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V.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  PARTAGE AND LEASING 
Partage and leasing have often been proposed as different means by which we 
might achieve an equitable balance between the benefits stemming from the 
international circulation of cultural artifacts and the desirability of protecting the 
cultural patrimony of source nations.  Partage is a time-honored arrangement by 
which archeologists and owners of archaeological sites—typically governments—
agree to divide between themselves artifacts excavated by the archaeologists.167  
Partage thereby enables source nations to acquire materials that would otherwise 
remain underground—or be looted or destroyed—through the economic largesse 
and technical expertise of foreign archaeologists.168 
More recently, the leasing of antiquities by source nations has been proposed as 
a means by which source nations might benefit financially from the international 
circulation of cultural artifacts found within their borders.169  Economists Michael 
Kremer and Tom Wilkening, for instance, have suggested that leasing antiquities 
could not only provide source nations welcome revenues but also assist in 
achieving the objectives of their commonly ineffective antiquities export bans.170  
They have argued that blanket prohibitions on the export of cultural property have 
actually fueled the black market for these goods and that leases could “mitigate the 
incentive problems that arise from export bans that can perversely increase risks to 
antiquities.”171 
Lurking behind both the partage and leasing solutions, however, are two 
dubious premises: first, that cultural artifacts are non-renewable resources, like 
gems and fossil fuels; and second, that these artifacts hold special psychic 
significance to those now inhabiting the lands on which these objects were created 
or found.172 
To an increasing extent, tangible cultural artifacts are renewable resources.  Not 
only can we replace or build upon works of cultural property that have been lost or 
 
 167. “Partage” is derived from the French partager, “to share.” 
 168. See generally JAMES CUNO, WHO OWNS ANTIQUITY?  MUSEUMS AND THE BATTLE OVER 
OUR ANCIENT HERITAGE (2008).   
 169. See, e.g., Silvia Beltrametti, Museum Strategies: Leasing Antiquities, 36 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 
203 (2013) (considering potential benefits of leasing ancient classical artifacts from Italy and Greece to 
United States museums).   
 170. Michael Kremer & Tom Wilkening, Protecting Antiquities: A Role for Long-Term Leases? 
(Harvard University Department of Economics, Working Paper, 2014), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/
kremer/files/antiquities_qje_draft_feb6_2014.pdf?m=1392050812 [http://perma.cc/DXX8-PBAM] 
(suggesting that export prohibitions promulgated pursuant to the UNESCO Convention, particularly in 
nations lacking the resources or will to enforce them may, in fact, promote the destruction or illegal sale 
of these objects). 
 171. Id. at 3.   
 172. Both premises were used, for instance, by University of Glasgow researcher, Neil Brodie, in 
his presentation on the state of cultural property protection in Syria today.  Neil Brodie, Keynote Lecture 
at the University of Chicago Neubauer Collegium: Archaeological Looting: Realities and Possibility for 
New Policy Approaches (Feb. 28, 2015).   
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damaged through intentional destruction or normal disintegration, but also we can 
increasingly use technologies to regenerate them.173  As this article suggests, this 
regenerative capacity progressively leads to a perception and valuation of these 
objects primarily as containers of information about human expression rather than 
material artifacts.174  Neil Silberman, of the International Council on Monuments 
and Sites, refers to this phenomenon as development of a “meta-cultural property”: 
While precise digital imaging of such politically and emotionally fraught cultural 
properties as the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Elgin marbles have not stilled the protests 
about the legalities of their current physical possession, they have nevertheless created 
a new kind of cultural property a kind of meta-cultural property that represents a 
shared global culture that we are creating today.175 
The corporeality of visual and three-dimensional cultural artifacts once relegated 
them, and their creators, to an intellectual and aesthetic rank below that of works 
and creators of philosophy, poetry, and music.176  The dematerialization of these 
works made possible by 3D technologies allows these objects to approach the level 
of great works of music and literature, whose prestige and cultural value have been 
enhanced by their capacity to transcend geographical and temporal boundaries, and 
positively influence the lives of all humanity.177  This dematerialization also holds 
the potential to mitigate the loss of cultural artifacts by theft or politically 
motivated wanton destruction favored lately by the Islamic State.178 
B.  CULTURAL PROPERTY, CULTURAL TRIBALISM 
Around the year 2000 a contingent of students and faculty members from 
Stanford and the University of Washington created a digital 3D scan of 
Michelangelo’s David.179  A retired member of Stanford’s computer science 
 
 173. See supra Introduction.   
 174.  Id.   
 175. See Silberman, supra note 93, at 367.   
 176. In Leonardo’s time painting was considered “vulgar to its very roots . . . a work and a labor of 
the body rather than of the mind and, more often than not, exercised by the ignorant.”  JAMES GARDNER, 
CULTURE OR TRASH? A PROVOCATIVE VIEW OF CONTEMPORARY PAINTING, SCULPTURE, AND OTHER 
COSTLY COMMODITIES 1 (1993) (quoting Leonardo’s contemporary, the classical scholar Mario 
Equicola).   
 177. While cultural monuments like tombs and temples were generally intended by their creators 
to remain moored to a particular location, the aesthetic and informational worth of moveable objects like 
paintings and statuary often does not depend upon their presence at a particular location.  Coins are an 
obvious example of cultural property that is created with the intention that it be circulated.   
 178. See John Simon, For Preventing Theft Japan Temple Worships 3D Printed Buddha, 3DERS 
(June 4, 2015), http://www.3ders.org/articles/20150604-for-preventing-theft-japan-temple-worships-3d-
printed-buddha.html [http://perma.cc/E4RY-TH99] (noting that over 160 original statues in public 
temples have been replaced with 3D replicas); Jonathan Webb, ‘Cyber-archaeology’ Salvages Lost Iraqi 
Art, BBC NEWS (May 19, 2015) http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-32742622 [http://
perma.cc/7LEE-62KR] (discussing crowd sourcing of photos of now-destroyed artifacts that allows for 
the creation of 3D images of these objects).  
 179. Marc Levoy, The Digital Michelangelo Project, http://graphics.stanford.edu/projects/mich/ 
[http://perma.cc/G8MV-8W5D] (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).   
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department involved in the project has arrogated to himself autonomous control 
over access to the billion-polygon 3D model, the result of a communal effort 
involving intellectual input from many students and faculty members.180  Along 
with a list of daunting prerequisites for access to—and limitations on use of—
Stanford’s project data is an exhortation that those granted access to this 
information “keep renderings and use of the data in good taste” because the 
artifacts in question “are the proud artistic patrimony of Italy.”181 
Michelangelo was Florentine; the political and geographical entity that we know 
today as Italy did not exist until the middle of the 1800s.  Therefore, what once 
may have been considered an artifact of the Florentine Republic has now been 
incorporated into the patrimony of the vastly larger nation of Italy.  This raises the 
question why, given the mutability of political boundaries, we shouldn’t now 
consider the artifact part of an even broader patrimony of human accomplishment 
of the European Union—membership to which the economically iffy Italy 
tenaciously clings—or even of the world. 
Attributing emotional attachment between a particular group of living humans 
and aged cultural artifacts, based upon contemporary political or geographical ties, 
implies tribalism and deleterious jingoism.  Such ginned up attachment is akin to 
the allegiance of a fan of a professional sports team that is based simply on the fact 
that he resides in the city attached to the team’s name.  Fans of the San Francisco 
Giants did not win the 2014 World Series; the individual ballplayers did.182  A 
fan’s derivation of pride or chagrin, therefore, from the performance of individual 
team members who share nothing in common with him other than proximity to a 
particular urban location, is a harmless fatuity until it curdles into feelings that 
generate hooliganism and sectarian violence.183 
Antiquities, like natural resources, are precious in part because of their scarcity 
and age, but also because the only investment required for capitalizing on either is 
 
 180. Marc Levoy, The Digital Michelangelo Project  Archive of 3D Models, http://
graphics.stanford.edu/data/mich/#Obtaining%20the%20data [http://perma.cc/L33X-22UA] (last updated 
July 21, 2009).  The project was funded by Stanford and the Paul Allen Foundation.   
 181. Id.  Marc Levoy, author of the access restrictions, claims that they reflect terms he negotiated 
with Italian authorities.  He declined the author’s request to review a copy of the agreement between 
Stanford and the Italian government because of “the delicate nature of my relationships with the Italian 
government.”  E-mail from Marc Levoy to Charles Cronin (Oct. 12, 2014) (on file with author).  The 
posted restrictions to, and use of, the data may very well reflect the terms of an agreement struck 
between Marc Levoy and the Italian authorities.  One wonders, however, whether Stanford authorized a 
member of its computer science faculty both to negotiate on its behalf with a foreign government the 
terms of use of public domain work data obtained by a team of students and faculty members funded by 
the University, and also to control access to, and use of, what appears to be mainly the intellectual 
property of Stanford and the University of Washington.  
 182. See David Waldstein, Bumgarner, a Three-Ring Master, Leads San Francisco to Its Third 
Title in Five Seasons, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2014, at B14, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/sports/
baseball/world-series-2014-giants-beat-royals-in-game-7-to-win-title.html. 
 183. The author admits to having experienced a flutter of pride upon learning that his college’s 
(Oberlin) football team is known for having maintained one of the longest losing streaks in collegiate 
athletics.  Football (or soccer) hooliganism is found worldwide.  See Football Hooliganism, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Football_hooliganism. 
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the expense of extracting it from the ground.  Ancient Greek pots that may be 
buried in a contemporary Roman garden have no greater emotional connection 
specific to the garden’s owner than has for me the crude oil under my garden near 
Los Angeles’s La Brea tar pits.  This is because the contemporary Roman, and 
everyone he knows, contributed no more to the creation of the Greek pots than I did 
to the fossil fuel. 
Governments’ assertions of ownership to all ancient cultural artifacts found on 
private land reflect a paternalist view that state dominion over these objects is 
necessary to safeguard the particular psychic significance they hold for the nation’s 
current and future citizenries.  In fact, these assertions of ownership have not only 
promoted clandestine excavations and an illegal market in which to sell their 
findings but have also ascribed to objects a distorted political significance. 
A Greek statue buried for millennia in Sicily holds for contemporary Italians 
little of the meaning that, for instance, the relatively recently built and universally 
long recognized Arc de Triomphe, Washington Monument, and Little Mermaid 
hold for contemporary French, United States, and Danish citizens respectively.  
The imposition through fiat of national significance to cultural artifacts makes 
political pawns of these objects, and thereby more attractive targets for looting and 
destruction by enemies of the state, and even its own citizens. 
C.  SUGGESTION 
The crux of this discussion is that the value of cultural artifacts is generated 
largely by the intellectual expression they manifest.  Digital technologies make 
increasingly possible the reproduction of even three-dimensional artifacts that are 
indistinguishable from the originals.  This development challenges the value we 
ascribe to the aura of original renderings of tangible cultural artifacts.  Stripped of 
their auras, the values of these works can be reduced to the sum of the value of the 
physical materials deployed and that ascribable to the application of intellectual 
expression in their creation. 
In short, digital technologies make possible the dematerializing of cultural 
artifacts.  If we were to perceive these artifacts mainly as works of information 
rather than of tangible property, the location of the original instantiations of them 
would be of little significance.  Using digital 3D technologies, source nations might 
eventually retain the essential value of cultural artifacts found within their borders, 
while simultaneously capitalizing upon sales of the originals to those collectors 
who put a premium on the value of whatever remains of the aura of the original. 
The world’s resources are not apportioned equally:  Saudi Arabia has a surfeit of 
oil; Italy has a surfeit of Greek and Roman artifacts; the United States has a surfeit 
of computing machinery and entertainment media content.  Despite the fact that 
computers and Hollywood movies are part of Unites States cultural heritage, we 
readily sell to eager buyers throughout the world surpluses of tangible and 
intangible products that manifest our patrimony of technological prowess.  Sales of 
such surpluses, in turn, provide funds by which Americans acquire objects for 
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which the United States has a deficit:  antiquities. 
In an era in which digital technologies can provide superb images, and even 
replicas, of cultural artifacts, repatriation claims for these items become 
increasingly tenuous. If I owned an Apple computer—a cultural artifact of the 
United States—built by Steve Jobs himself, I would readily sell it to whoever 
places the highest value on its aura, buy a computer identical to the prototype, and 
pocket the difference.184  Why would contemporary Italians and Greeks be more 
attached to the innumerable, and often nearly indistinguishable, antiquities under 
their soil than I am to a computer built by a contemporary who lived in the country, 
state, and city in which I once lived?  Antiquities, like Job’s handmade computer, 
are chattels that embody intellectual investment. Given their age, they have no 
psychic or spiritual connection that is specific to twenty-first century Europeans, 
and now can be monetized and increasingly accurately replicated. 
In 2011 the Getty Museum gave to the Italian government its statue of 
Aphrodite that the Italians claimed had been illegally excavated in Sicily.  After 
years of delighting hundreds of thousands of admirers in sumptuous glory at the 
Getty Villa in Malibu, the work now languishes in obscurity in a provincial 
museum in the remote and necessitous Sicilian town of Aidone.185  The Getty paid 
$18 million (close to $35 million today) for its Aphrodite.  If the Italian 
government had obtained that sum—rather than Robin Symes, a convicted felon in 
London who sold the work to the Getty—it could have obtained an exact 3D print 
replica of the statue, plus a Ford Fiesta apiece for over half the residents of 
Aidone.186  No doubt such an outcome would have been far more welcome to both 
the Aidonese and the Getty—not to mention museumgoers worldwide. 
 
 
 184. Once again proving the accuracy of H. L. Menken’s observation that “nobody ever went 
broke underestimating the taste of the American public,” the Henry Ford Museum recently paid 
$905,000 for an “Apple-1 Computer with exceptional provenance and in beautiful working condition.”  
Press Release, Bonhams, The World’s Most Expensive Apple (Oct. 23, 2014), http://
www.bonhams.com/press_release/17720/ [https://perma.cc/8ANJ-6ZJW?type=image].    
 185. In 2012 there were 13,410 visitors to the museum in Aidone.  See Hugh Eakin, Citing 
Inequity, Sicily Bans Loans of 23 Artworks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2013, at C1, http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/11/27/arts/design/citing-inequity-sicily-bans-loans-of-23-artworks.html.  This is less than half the 
number of visitors to the same museum two years earlier.  See Donadio, supra note 18 (noting the 
effects of Sicily’s “renowned . . . political corruption,” and lack of reliable public transportation on the 
ability to access cultural monuments).  In 2014 there were almost 1.8 million visitors to the Getty 
museums.  James Cuno, 2014 by the Numbers, GETTY MUSEUM (Dec. 15, 2014), http://blogs.getty.edu/
iris/2014-by-the-numbers/ [http://perma.cc/4PS7-69AT].   
 186. See Mark Townsend, The Dealer $10m, and the Missing Art Treasures, THE GUARDIAN, 
(Sept. 12, 2006), http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2009/sep/13/antiques-art-business-robin-
symes.  A Ford Fiesta, 2015 model, costs about $14,000; Aidone has a population of about 5,000.  
